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ABSTRACT  
   
The need for a critical education in a democracy, its difficulties, and how to 
reform this field requires urgent attention. This project begins with the premise that 
education is necessary for a vibrant democracy. While examining differing voices that 
advocate for educational reform, mainly that of Critical Pedagogy, it is shown how 
conflicting forms are advocating similar ideals. Henry Giroux and David Horowitz, 
both reformers that are on opposite sides of the political spectrum appear to have 
similar goals. Yet, the question becomes how to solve these differences between 
these parties? By examining the philosophical origins of these projects and 
explicating differences rooted in human nature and the good, the basic differences 
can begin to be shown. In showing these differences it requires going back to the 
work of Kant. Kant shows the necessity of beginning with philosophy and 
examining basic assumptions in order to begin to critique and build an education that 
would guarantee equality. 
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Chapter 1 
EDUCATION AND THE NEED FOR REFORM 
Introduction: Voices for Reform: 
Numerous discordant voices in the history of US education have been crying out for 
reform. Despite the fact that education has been a high priority for the past few 
presidential administrations, arguably there has been little improvement in the US in 
K-12 education. This point is emphasized in the recent documentary Waiting for 
Superman.1 A recent Time magazine article reviewing Waiting for Superman notes that 
68% of eighth graders score below proficient in reading and 69% in math. And, 
despite the increase in per-pupil spending by 123% from 1971 to 20062 there has 
been no improvement in reading score. All that has been achieved through 
governmental cynosure of education can be equated to simply attempting to treat 
symptoms and not the root cause. Much of the backlash to the film has been against 
how the director Davis Guggenheim3 was not honest about his assessment of public 
education and charter schools. Despite backlash against this film which accuses it of 
negatively portraying public schools, vilifying unions, and lifting up charter schools it 
does leave a yearning for something more. Revealed here is the acute necessity for 
much more salient talk about education, not less, and not merely talk in which much 
more is said than done. Rather, more critical dialectical discussion about our 
                                                
1   Waiting for Superman, Directed by Davis Guggenheim (2010; New York: Paramount 
Vantage, 2011) Documentary. 
 
2  "Waiting for 'Superman': A Call to Action for U.S. Schools - what Makes a School 
Great - TIME " 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2019663_2020590,0
0.html (accessed 4/1/2011, 2011). 
 
3 Guggenheim also did an acclaimed documentary about global warming, An 
Inconvenient Truth. 
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presuppositions and theoretical and practical implications that are in each philosophy 
of education is needed. 
 The movie follows five kids, and their parents, on their misadventures in 
attempting to avoid attending the vilified public school for the highly lauded charter 
school. The movie portrays the public schools as failing to educate kids while the 
charter schools are depicted to show them curbing the tide against the failing public 
education system. The major premise of the movie is that public schools are 
underperforming, filled with complacent tenured teachers, and their teachers unions 
do not serve the kids.4 The film stresses the need for kids to come first, not teachers. 
On Guggenheim’s account, if teachers do not perform an adequately at their job, 
they ought to be fired. Yet, for us, in this project it ought to be asked: how does one 
know what is adequate, exceptional, or poor? In other words: by what means, or 
whose means is the success of education being measured?  
 Many reviews have pointed to flaws in the film, either where something was 
under emphasized or over emphasized. For example education scholar Diane 
Ravitch says the film failed to inform its audience that in charter schools only “17 
percent were superior to a matched traditional public school; 37 percent were worse 
than the public school; and the remaining 46 percent had academic gains no different 
from that of a similar public school.”5 The weight placed upon “at fault” teachers 
was too heavy. Ravitch has claimed that according to most agreed-upon accounts, 
                                                
4  "The Myth of Charter Schools by Diane Ravitch | the New York Review of 
Books" http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/nov/11/myth-charter-
schools/ (accessed 4/1/2011, 2011).Rick Ayers and William Ayers, Teaching the Taboo: 
Courage and Imagination in the Classroom (0) Teachers College Press. 2010, Goldstein, 
Dana, “Grading ‘Waiting for Superman,’ Nation, Oct. 11, 2010.  
 
5 Ibid. 
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10-20 percent of achievement is due to the work of teachers.6 Furthermore, Ravitch 
believes that Guggenheim essentially hijacked the word reform for the privatization of 
education throughout the film. It is argued that Guggenheim’s portrayal of public 
teachers as listless simply misapprehends the reality that there are caring and 
thoughtful teachers who work hard in the public sector.7 
Much more can be said about the misrepresentations appearing in the film 
and how these demarcate and alienate other reforming voices. Though, regardless of 
these criticisms, the film has been crucial in raising public awareness about the need 
for reform in primary and secondary educational systems. Though philosophies of 
education differ in terms of proposing a solution to the problem, none disagree 
about education’s vitality in a vibrant democracy and the need for reform. The 
debate has always been about what the word “reform” means. 
To understand where the popular belief for reform lays Time recently asked 
for the American people’s thoughts about educational reform: 67% of the adults 
surveyed by Time believe our education system is in a crisis. Even Ravitch, who had 
severe reservations about the film, noted that, overwhelmingly, Americans are 
dissatisfied with public education.8 The method through which these people believe 
education will be reformed is predominantly (52%) by getting parents to be more 
involved, followed by (24%) the notion that what is needed are more effective 
teachers. A critical question is: what is this increased involvement and how will the 
                                                
6  Ibid. 
 
7  Rick Ayers and Ayers, Teaching the Taboo: Courage and Imagination in the Classroom  
 
8  The Myth of Charter Schools by Diane Ravitch | the New York Review of Books  
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teachers be more effective? Is it through increased training (30% believe so)? Or, is 
even more critical examination of assumptions necessary?9 
 In surveying education one prominent area needing attention is higher 
education with its rise and wide spread success in American society. If K-12 could 
mimic the higher education’s accomplishments over the decades then it could be 
more successful. Better teacher training models or different curricular content could 
lead to better results in the areas America is becoming increasingly deficient in. Our 
universities are among the best in the world. So, how are teachers not getting the 
preparation they need? One voice, Jonathan Cole (former provost at Columbia 
University) explicates how the American University system came to preeminence, the 
current state of higher education, and the threats to it, in The Great American 
University.10 As it currently stands, according to a study done by Shanghai Jiao 
University in 2008, our university system is the best in the world; 17 out of the top 
20, and 40 out of the top 50 universities are within the United States.11 Cole sights a 
few reasons for this being the case: the resources put into the university system (as it 
stand Harvard’s endowment is $34.9 billions dollars,12 our dual focus upon 
                                                
9  Waiting for 'Superman': A Call to Action for U.S. Schools - what Makes a School 
Great - TIME  
 
10  Jonathan R. Cole, Great American University:  Its Rise to Preeminence, its Indispensable 
National Role, Why it must be Protected (New York, NY, USA: Public Affairs, 2010). 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/asulib/docDetail.action?docID=10359195. 
 
11 www.arwu.org/ARWU2008.jsp ranks can often be a difficult thing and are only 
meant to point out that out of man major universities around the world the U.S. is 
consistently dominant. Ibid. 
 
12 This Cole says, is not an unusually number for having a successful top tier research 
university. 
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humanities and sciences, but cardinally our stances on academic freedom and 
competition.  
 Admonishingly though, Cole posits that threats from within and outside of 
the universities endanger the US’s global positioning in education. One such threat 
that identified is academic dogmatism. Dogmatism is a threat to the fundamental 
reason for the American University’s success: academic freedom.13 Dogmatism for 
Cole, and I agree with him, ought not be equated with such claims that are lacking in 
evidence or premature ideas. Rather,  
through the expression of internal academic power, it is possible for faculty 
members to systematically exclude from the conversation those whose views 
offend the central dogma of the field; in other words, alternative views are 
sometimes perceived as intellectual threats because, if given the chance, their 
proponents may produce counter-evidence and arguments refuting 
conventional claims.14 
 
There are premature ideas in that they have not been developed enough, do not 
properly address positions currently held, or misrepresent those positions that are all 
rejected. Rather, dogmatism ought to be understood as an unjust use of power to 
disparage dissenting positions, not for lack academic rigor or misapprehensions, but 
because of the challenge to popular positioning. This view of dogmatism is 
concomitant with views of power and hegemony that are used to oppress minority 
positions.  
                                                
13 Ibid.  
 
14 Ibid., 379.  
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Cole and others15 all state that the use of coercion in hiring and appointing of 
tenure become issues. Ideas that are not held by the majority are removed from the 
academy.16 Cole finds this reminiscent of the McCarthy era Red Scare that ended in a 
number of faculty members being fired. He continues to point out that in recent 
years the Patriot Act has resulted in constraints upon various areas of academia for 
example, in biological research with harmful pathogen and suspicion of the 
researchers involvement in terrorist attacks.17 Cole also communicates cases such as 
associate professor of anthropology and activist Nicholas de Genova’s release from 
Columbia University after he denounced the Iraq war in 2003. Though this should 
not be necessarily taken as fact, it assists in showing that the academy needs to 
protect itself against such dogmatic agendas from any source (inside and outside) in 
order to continue on the path of critical inquiry and academic freedom. The problem 
is that what is considered dogmatic and legitimate can, at times, be dictated by one’s 
prior commitments such as in politics.18 
 For instance, historically the debate about educational reform has not agreed 
upon much more than the need for reform. Historian Richard Hofstadter notes that 
                                                
15 One such person that will be talked about is David Horowitz and thinkers from 
Critical Pedagogy. This is not to ideologically place them together rather, this is to 
show a common rhetoric used against other positions.  
 
16  David Horowitz, Indoctrination U.: The Left's War Against Academic Freedom (New 
York: Encounter Books, 2007), 159.Cole, Great American University:  Its Rise to 
Preeminence, its Indispensable National Role, Why it must be Protected 
 
18 I return to this idea of political dogmatism later by examining an ideological debate 
between David Horowitz and Henry Giroux. Though this is often a position that can 
be dismissed as quiet unfound or on the level of conspiracy theories. This is still a 
position that must be addressed and not simply dismissed because of its immediate 
threat to academic freedom. However, I want to posit that there are in fact these real 
ideological differences, be they conscious or unconscious, that work themselves out 
in plays of power that are rooted in more basic differences. 
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the history of educational commentary has been “a literature of avid criticism and 
bitter complaint."19 Of the many voices yearning for reform it will be helpful to 
know at least these four views that have differences in their goals and means to those 
goals such as progressive, conservative, liberal, and radical. Susan Semel’s distinction 
between these four groups is helpful. The Progressives are noted for seeing schools 
as “central to solving social problems, as vehicles for upward mobility, as essential to 
the development of individual potential, and as an integral part of a democratic 
society.”20 The Conservatives “see the role of school as providing the necessary 
educational training to ensure that the most talented and hard-working individuals 
receive the tools necessary to maximize economic and social productivity."21 The 
Liberal “stresses the school's role in providing the necessary education to ensure that 
all students have an equal opportunity to succeed in society."22 Finally, the radicals 
believe schools ought to ‘eliminate inequalities.’ They argue that, “the school's role is 
to reproduce the unequal economic conditions of the capitalist economy and to 
socialize individuals to accept the legitimacy of the society."23 This list is not 
comprehensive; there are traditionalist, neo-liberal, neo-conservatives, etc. Some of 
these positions might over lap and have waxed and waned over time. For instance, 
                                                
19  Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: A.A. Knopf, 
1964; 1963), 301. 
 
20  Susan F. Semel, “Introduction,” in Foundations of Education: The Essential Texts, ed. 
Susan F. Semel.  (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2010), 6. 
 
21  Ibid., 7 
 
22  Ibid., 7 
 
23  Ibid., 7 
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by 1995 much of the enthusiasm behind the progressive movement diminished.24 
What these views have in common is the ideal for a free democratic society. Yet, 
they vary in terms of what this actually means or what it looks like to create a free 
democratic society. Depending upon the political, ideological, worldview, or 
epistemic position with which one approaches education, the “ought” in education 
necessarily will be different. 
Prima facie, education is necessary for a vibrant democracy. The state itself has 
a vested interest in the education of its citizens for its own future existence. The state 
of education is foretelling of the future condition of the state. All things remain the 
same if education is in desperate times now the state will be in desperate times soon. 
Therefore, it is an understatement to say that (only) education is experiencing an 
immense need for reform, but the totality of democracy is threatened. All of these 
views that have been covered so far are simply indicators, not solutions to the 
problem.  
 In seeing the ongoing debate it can be seen that competing understandings of 
what the ‘ought’ in education are being put forth and without coming to agreement 
children and democracy are being harmed. More thought in the areas of the theory 
and practice of education is that for which this situation calls. Such questions as: 
what is a good teacher? What ought to be taught? Who ought to teach? What 
training will they need? Otherwise, education is going to sink deeper into this 
quagmire where the whole system will decay and untimely result in a societal 
collapse. This project will start by addressing this problem at a more basic level. 
                                                
24 Lawrence A. Cremin, “The Progressive Movement in American Education: A 
Perspective,” in Foundation of Education: The Essential Texts ed. Susan F. Semel (Milton 
Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2010). 30. 
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However, no project is neutral in regard to its assumptions and meaning. In an 
attempt to get a broader perspective that is not already committed to a particular 
politics or ideology, one must begin by doing Philosophy. The method of Philosophy 
is that of critical inquiry. It is the only field that is able to ask questions that other 
fields merely presuppose, and the only field that is common amongst us all. For 
instance, the Social Sciences, Humanities, and Literature assume particular views of 
human nature and the real (though often conflicting within and between these 
fields). Only through critical inquiry that challenges more basic assumptions can the 
present dogmas be called into question and made to give an account. Recalling what 
has been said of dogmas earlier, this is not mere assumption, but assumptions that 
do not allow veracious challenges. Philosophy is the most basic mode of inquiry that 
is shared by all. Since all inquire as to the meaning of a thing, all rudimentarily do 
Philosophy. Therefore, the sense of the word Philosophy here is simply being the 
critical use of reason to test statements and assumptions for meaning. That is to say, 
to do as Socrates did, ask pressing questions that expose false assumptions.25 
To being with Philosophy one must consider its Socratic founder and his 
dictum that the unexamined life is not worth living. I begin though with Aristotle, 
because he gives guidance for this next section on differing philosophies of 
education by way of the concept of telos. Aristotle in his Ethics reminds his readers 
that every action is a means towards a definite end.26 Furthermore, that there are 
                                                
25 Through invoking Socrates as the founder of Philosophy could bring a critique 
against this as being Western and ignoring the East. So I emphasize again that this is 
simply asking basic questions, that is what is meant by the critical use of Philosopher 
here.  
 
26  Aristotle, W. D. Ross and Lesley Brown, The Nicomachean Ethics [Nicomachean 
ethics.English] (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3. 
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groups of actions like war making, engineering, and education that all have particular 
ends. The actions that broadly constitute education are: curriculum, methodologies, 
ideology, learning, teaching, administrating, and parenting. They share the common 
telos of engendering a human being. 
The good for the state, according to Aristotle, is higher than the individual 
good of a particular person. The state is comprised of persons with the same good as 
the individual, but brings together people of various talents and abilities to reach that 
goal together. This work benefits all persons corporately and communally. Socratics 
thought of this communal work as the work of politics. Today, that work is more 
closely related to the work done in education, rather than our popular conception of 
politics. Perhaps today’s politics is like Athenian political sophistry than the Socratics 
idealist concept of politics that is more closely related to an ideal education.   
Problems arise when beginning to define what is “the good,” the end in-
itself, the teleological end. Aristotle’s contemporaries claimed that it was clear and 
obvious. Such things as pleasure, wealth, or honor were seen as the good. Aristotle 
thought men were fickle in their claims of what was good. For instance when poor, 
one thinks the good to be wealth. When sick one thinks it to be health.27 Aristotle 
contrastingly posits that whatever the good is it is inalienable for mankind. Wealth, 
health, pleasure and everything can be taken away from man, but the one thing that 
cannot is knowledge. This furthers the emphasis that the result of education 
(knowledge) is the one thing that cannot to taken from us. That which is learned and 
known cannot be stripped from persons.28 Old age, sickness, death, oppression (in 
                                                
27  Ibid., 7 
 
28  Ibid., 10 
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any of its various forms), or any amount of suffering can separate a man/woman 
from all temporal goods, but they cannot separate or stop a person from obtaining 
or retaining knowledge. Therefore, it can be put forth that education’s primary 
dealing is that of training, raising, or cultivating, the individual in knowledge of the 
good. 
Philosophies of Education 
To get to the current situation the web of ideas that constitute this modern 
debate must first be explicated. The modern context that this project will be 
engaging in is that of the ‘radical’ position Critical Pedagogy. I will begin by giving a 
brief overview of some philosophies of education and their view on what makes an 
educated person. Beginning with salient pieces from John Locke, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and then leading us into post-modernity. I will show how 
these similar philosophies, while different in many less basic ways, are rooted in 
more basic assumptions. This will serve as a ground from which to define this 
modern problem in education. It should be noted that these three Philosophers form 
a sort of canon for different schools of philosophy. Therefore, Marx’s conception, 
though applied by many to the educational crisis, will be left out because Rousseau is 
a precursor to Marx. Marx’s ideas begin with Rousseau. In a way much of Marx’s 
basic assumptions appear to derive from Rousseau and since this section is 
particularly concerned with the more basic assumptions Marx will, for now, be left 
out.29 
This thesis will focus on the discourse of Critical Pedagogy. I will argue that 
it gives us necessary insight into the current crisis and its possible solutions. Critical 
                                                
29 Though the application of Marx in education is covered here his own work and its 
application is not. 
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Pedagogy is a theory that has described itself as being a ‘critical’ education for a 
democratic society. This claim is examined to see if it is in accordance with its basic 
assumptions. Currently, there is a constant and passionate disagreement between 
Critical Pedagogy theorists, Henry Giroux, and Liberal Communist (now turned 
conservative) David Horowitz. This zealous disagreement, though at times can be 
reduced to fallacious refutations, should not detract from the gravity of the topic. 
Rather, it should cause one to think deeper about claims being made and those being 
presupposed. This is a debate to which I must later return. But, for now it suffices as 
a signpost to further note the ongoing debate about the nature of education.  
To begin this brief survey of educational philosophies, I will outline the 
contributions of John Locke. Peter Gay, a history professor from Yale, says of 
Locke’s Thoughts Concerning Education, that it “stands at the beginning of the long cycle 
of modernity, but it stands, too, at the end, and as the climax, of a long evolution—
the discovery of the child.”30 It was at the dawn of the Enlightenment that the child 
began to gain a new place in society. In the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the 
child was treated as a small adult, or a play thing for adults which often resulted in 
obscene placements of the child. 
The radical Locke attempted to usher in a new rational understanding of how 
to approach the concept of childhood. Locke saw the child as a rational being, one 
that grew in their capacity to reason. Education to Locke became a means of 
instilling virtue in the child so that they would be well mannered, civic-minded 
                                                
30 Peter Gay, “Introduction,” in John Locke on Education, ed. Peter Gay. Philosophy of 
Education: The Essential Texts, ed. Steven M. Cahn,  (New York: Routledge, 2009), 200. 
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Englishmen.31 He saw the use of discipline in the child’s life as taking them away 
from vices such as their pleasures might lead them, but Locke wanted them to learn 
to be disciplined in their desires by making them subservient to reason. Too much 
punishment and the education would do very little good, too little and the child 
would be good for nothing. In this Locke advised parents to teach their children by 
example. He did not want adults to inundate children with rote memorization and 
burden them with learning. Rather, Locke felt, education stood as an 
acquaintanceship for the child to the world. This, perhaps, can be summarized as an 
education as a way of life. Locke concerned himself with every facet of the child’s 
life: health, discipline, geometry, language, play, and prayer.   
Writing in response to the broadly held societal acceptance of Locke’s maxim 
“reason with children,” 32 Jean-Jacques Rousseau in Emlie explicates his own 
philosophy of education that is an antinomy with Locke’s. Rousseau saw no duller 
children than those educated under Locke’s maxim, “reason with children.” Rather, 
Rousseau desired a return, as it were, to natural man. He saw the constraints of 
society as harmful things imposed upon men that deviated from man’s good nature. 
His ideal educational practices consisted of negative examples to the child. He used 
the example of a child breaking a window and in response says, “let the wind blow 
on him night and day and do not worry about him catching cold.”33 It was through 
                                                
31 Our modern ideals of a public education were not present in Locke’s day and 
education in the formal sense began with the notion of making gentlemen. This of 
course minimized it to only a certain number of privileged persons in Locke’s day. 
 
32  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Christopher Kelly and Allan David Bloom, Emile Or on 
Education: Includes Emile and Sophie, Or the Solitaries [Emile. English], Vol. 13 (Hanover, 
N.H.: Dartmouth College Press, 2010), 89. 
 
33  Ibid., 155 
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negative examples that the child would learn vice and virtue. Only when the child 
was older (eighteen) would he want to begin teaching the child to comprehend truth 
and meaning. In terms of religion, he would go no further than the light of reason in 
natural religion and then allow the child to choose.34  
The most prominent difference between Locke and Rousseau lay in their 
presupposition of man’s nature. Locke, in accordance with his Calvinistic 
surrounding, held that men were fundamentally wicked in themselves and reason 
needed to guide their desires. In contrast, Rousseau held that society was the cause 
of corruption in man. Rousseau thought to raise Emile away from society and avoid 
the corruptions of society. Take, for instance, Rousseau’s stance upon history: “Our 
historians all begin where they ought to finish. Only bad men achieve fame: the good 
are either forgotten or held up in ridicule. Like philosophy, history always slanders 
mankind.”35 Interestingly, Rousseau was actually breaking with the Calvinistic society 
in which he was brought up in that he aimed to debunk the notion of the depravity 
of mankind. These two thinkers laid the groundwork from which a multiplicity of 
debates would arise around the difference of the condition of man.  
William Boyd explains that Rousseau’s conception of a child’s right to live, as 
an adolescent, was revolutionary and was a precursor for later psychology.36 He 
asserted that only through the active interest in the current state of a child’s 
                                                
34  Ibid., 221 
 
35 Jean-Jacques Rousseau. “The Emile of Jean Jacque Rousseau,” translated by 
William Boyd, in Steven M. Cahn, ed., Philosophy of Education: The Essential Texts (New 
York: Routledge, 2009), 228. 
 
36 William Boyd, “Editors Epilogue,” in The Emile of Jean Jacque Rousseau, translated 
and edited by William Boyd. Philosophy of Education: The Essential Texts, ed. Steven M. 
Cahn, (New York: Routledge, 2009), 248 
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upbringing would children be prepared for their later office as an adult. Furthermore, 
Boyd affirmed that it is this “democratic conception of humanity applied to 
childhood and youth, and is accepted in some fashion by all modern educators as an 
integral element in the educational ideal.”37 
Rousseau builds Emile’s education upon his theory developed in the Social 
Contract.38 In it Rousseau posits that, from the state of nature, man is inherently good 
and the evil he suffers is from society. It is here that Rousseau’s precursory theory to 
Marx can be seen in that “no man has a natural authority over his equal, and since 
force produce no right to any, all legal authority amongst men must be established 
on the basis of convention.”39 Rousseau found that power was socially constructed 
and only the infallible general will was capable to determine social relations of power.  
After Rousseau and Lock one of the next major Philosophers to take 
seriously education was Kant. Kant’s writing has had far reaching impact upon all 
forms of philosophy and no doubt they do the same in the realm of educational 
philosophy. By education Kant meant care, discipline, and instruction of the pupil.40 
This brought to the fore a utopian teleology realizable through education where the 
entirety of man’s nature was realized as the successive generations inched closer and 
became more sophisticated in this utopian ideal. It is in this light that Robert Louden 
                                                
37 Boyd, “Editors Epilogue,” 250. 
 
38  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, An Inquiry into the Nature of the Social Contract [Du contrat 
social. English] (Dublin: printed by B. Smith, for William Jones, 1791), 321. 
 
39  Ibid., 12 
 
40 Immanuel Kant, “Lectures on Pedagogy,” translated by Robert B. Louden. 
Philosophy of Education: The Essential Texts, ed. Steven M. Cahn, (New York: Routledge, 
2009), 253. 
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shows that Kant’s philosophy of history influences his philosophy of education.41 By 
care it is meant that the pupil make no harmful use of their power. In other words, it 
was the aim of education to seek the good for them. Discipline for Kant is the 
taming of the savage man or restraining of our savage inclinations, desires, and 
instincts.42 Finally, instruction consisted of the culturing or socialization of man 
towards which they would be open to the possibilities of choosing the ends they 
sought. 
Kant’s own philosophy of education borrowed much from Rousseau. For 
instance they shared the notion of nature as being fundamentally good.  
Good education is exactly that from which all the good in the world arises. 
The germs which lie in the human being must only be developed further and 
further. For one does not find grounds of evil in the natural predisposition of 
the human being. The only cause of evil is this, that nature is not brought 
under rules. In the human being lie only germs for the good.43 
 
Education, to Kant, stood as the demarcation between man’s animal nature and 
human (rational) nature. Kant said that the undisciplined (through no education, or 
left to himself) man is a savage, which was different to Rousseau’s notion of natural 
man. This differed from Rousseau in that Kant did not suppose, like Rousseau, that 
man left to nature would be much of a man at all. Where Kant differed is from 
whence morality arose: Kant claimed it could not be from nature whereas Rousseau 
felt it came from nature.  
 
 
                                                
41 Kant, “Lectures on Pedagogy,” 281. 
 
42 Ibid., 258 
 
43 Ibid., 258 
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Modern Diagnosis 
In order to bring this back to our modern era and see how similar conceptual 
frameworks are being once again used I will now go over a few thinkers who have, in 
their own way, called us to stop and think about education. As will be shown, each 
of the following thinkers builds upon the notion with which Kant worked, taking 
men from a savage state to one of being “more” human, using reason rather than 
merely listening to intuitions or instincts. For discourse about this subject and in 
order to reach different political realms I will only address the work of Theodore 
Adorno, Richard Hofstadter, and Alan Bloom. This will then provide a grounding 
that problematize education in such a way as to set the stage for Critical Pedagogy as 
the central theoretical feature of the current analysis.  
In the work “Education After Auschwitz” Adorno attempts to give a 
diagnosis of man’s reified self in relation to the darkness that arises in the human 
condition. He begins with the assertion that “the premier demand upon all education 
is that Auschwitz not happen again.”44 That Auschwitz was a relapse for humanity 
into barbarism and as long as the condition that has allowed for this to occur it will 
continue.  
Adorno’s analysis points him towards the subjective as the possibility of 
change, namely that of psychology. Appealing to any objective values, by which he 
means societal and political; eternal values because people will not take them 
seriously; or enlightenment of a persecuted minority would not aid humanity in 
                                                
44 T. W. Adorno, "Education After Auschwitz," Education for Maturity."[" Erziehung 
Zur Mündigkeit."] Frankfurt on Main, 1970, 2. 
 
 18 
reaching this goal Adorno has set education upon.45 Adorno supposes that the 
universal can only exert itself upon the particular in such a way as to destroy them 
and along with it the ability to resist. Adorno, rather, sets his analysis upon the 
persecutors. His analysis is upon the unreflected vented hatred and aggression that 
only through critical self-reflection in early childhood education can possibly 
circumvent. Hope, Adorno believes, is found with autonomy. Autonomy is a 
Kantian sense of reflection, self-determination, and non-cooperation.46 
Adorno’s keen focus upon that subject and their ability of reflection, self-
determination, and non-cooperation is understood in contrast to the reified 
consciousness. In the world of Auschwitz, personality types are produced such that 
they are more likely to identify themselves with the collective, rather than questions 
and reflect, they accept and do. Adorno likens this to an observer of sports. The 
spectator is so caught up in the game that they lose the sense of self. Through 
‘customs’ that are able to indicate membership in the collective and punish 
autonomy does the group then reify the consciousness of the subject rendering them 
incapable of autonomous action. This occurs, Adorno believes, through the use of 
hardening the self and others. This becomes a view of what ought a human to be, 
such that anyone else not like the hard collective is rendered non-human (object). 
 What Adorno argues though is that through this process of reification does 
one actually render themselves first, then others as objects. As one becomes hard, 
they no longer can cope with the anxieties that accompany this world and cause 
themselves to be incapable of having human experiences or emotions. Adorno 
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asserts that, “people of such a nature (reified consciousness) have, as it were, 
assimilated themselves to things. And then, when possible, they assimilate others to 
things.”47 The reified man sees the other, not as human, but simply as means towards 
their own ends. To put it differently, they deny their own humanity first, and in turn 
deny others, then through demonizing them they destroy others. Thus, Adorno 
believed that men could not love, which resulted in such atrocities as Auschwitz, and 
in fact continue to occur today. He avowed that men are blinded to their historical 
past and rather expand what exists contingently to be that which is absolute.48  
 Adorno brings to the fore the alleviation of human suffering brought upon 
by other humans as the goal of education. He asserts that it can only be through the 
alleviation of man’s psychology that this goal can be accomplished. The implications 
for education that Adorno and Marx highlight are exemplified well in the position of 
Critical Pedagogy. These works have heavily influenced many of the theorists that I 
will cover in the next section.  
Delving still further into the roots of education in America there is yet 
another voice telling of the reified, lethargic, and savage state of man. Historian 
Richard Hofstadter in the mid 60’s released his work, Anti-intellectualism in American 
Life. This was his attempt to trace the genesis of America’s adverse attitude towards 
the intellect. The fall of Protestant intellectualism in the 1700’s with the rise of the 
Great Awakenings had begun and the awakening of evangelicalism engendered an 
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intellectual apprehension and a religious anti-rationalism.49 This attitude permeated 
America and blighted the populace against any life of the mind. In fact the life of the 
mind was seen as antithetical to religion so much so that some feared, and still fear 
that those going to college will lose their faith due to challenges that arise therein.  
Hofstadter saw this endemicity of anti-intellectualism in the nation as being 
founded upon sheer utility;50 or rather what is thought to be of greatest utility. The 
quintessence of this is found in the traditional notion of the American dream, in 
which it is thought one need ‘only’ endure 30 years of labor to achieve a blissful state 
of rest from his labors.51 This attitude and belief towards this dream is antithetical to 
the incessant questioning of the intellect through critical inquiry. After all, why ask 
the meaning of things when what you are doing works? In summary of this position 
Hofstadter posits that anti-intellectualism is a resentment and suspicion of the life of 
the mind, and its opposite, intellectualism is questioning and playfulness towards 
discovery.52  
For Hofstadter the intellectual life is not anti-practical, but rather extra 
practical. This is what Cole would call the Louis Pasteur quadrant of inquiry.53 This 
mode of analysis’ emphasis is on solving problems and questions of fundamental 
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knowledge.54 Reaching back to the Socratics, this is perhaps the embodiment of the 
Socratic “examined life.” In this manner, education functions first as an avenue of 
questioning ourselves, then comes to have impact upon the world through 
questioning others. First it is through the becoming aware and raising awareness 
about the challenges and shortcomings seen in various pedagogical practices. 
In 1987, a more conservative social critique of America was published by 
Allan Bloom entitled, The Closing of the American Mind.55 It was praised by many and 
become a best seller. However, it was criticized by many authors some of whom are 
within Critical Pedagogy. Like Hofstadter, Bloom was writing in response to the lack 
or intellectualism in America. Distinct from Hofstadter, Bloom traces the roots of 
this movement back to Germany and the post-Enlightenment thinkers that arose 
from within the Germanic state such as Rousseau, Nietzsche, Marx, and Heidegger.  
Bloom’s thesis in this work is that American students are essentially 
complacent in regards to truth and its pursuit. Students come from a place where 
they hold that truth is relative. It is either purposed from psychology (Freud), 
historically (Nietzsche), or economically determined (Marx). To these views all of 
society is a product of events that determine meaning around us. There is no truth 
per se. Thus, they make no real distinction between good and evil and cease to seek 
after truth. Bloom posits that this is from the students having lost the sense of 
heroes, reading great literature, listening to great music, and having broken 
relationships that are rampant with divorce, cheap sex and love. This, according to 
Bloom, has been a result of Nietzsche’s observation that “God is dead.” 
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These theories have left man to his natural values thus Bloom thinks that 
truth and the good life become indiscoverable.56 Science has resolved that reason is 
powerless to discover values, and therefore abandoned the search. All that remains is 
the bleak will to power. The response to this is in terms of culture, “the unity of 
man’s brutish nature and all the arts and sciences he acquired in his movement from 
the state of nature to civil society.”57  
Bloom says that Socrates, in his pursuit for the essence of justice and truth, 
went against the common culture of the people around him and that this is 
essentially the purpose of the university. However, once Heidegger came to the 
scene, Bloom tells us, he used philosophy to further German culture, not to 
challenge it.58 With the university following in Heidegger’s footsteps Bloom sees its 
focus upon tolerance and openness as doing just that, not challenging and further the 
pursuit of truth. Instead Bloom thinks universities seem to conform to the cultural 
norms; because there is no truth, there is no distinction between good and evil. This 
leaves the university in an enigmatic situation.  
The university must ask: how do we educate our students? Yet, according to 
Bloom, it cannot answer this question. “To attempt to answer the question is already 
to philosophize and to begin to educate.”59 Bloom continues, “It is childishness to 
say, as some do, that everyone must be allowed to develop freely, that it is 
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authoritarian to impose a point of view on the student.”60 Bloom, like many others 
leads us to ask: whose education, whose values? Bloom explicates that it is the post-
modern position that has rendered the university inept because out of the chaos that 
is post-modern valuation and ethics comes the impossibility of making a reasonable 
choice.61 Thus, when a student asks the university to educate his whole person he 
finds a myriad of differing values and the university is wholly ill equipped to 
undertake the task.  
While the university still is educating persons, it has become bifurcated into 
sects. Bloom attributes the bifurcation of the universities schools to the incoherence 
of truth. There is no wholeness in the university. The social sciences, humanities, and 
sciences all think themselves to be the whole and others the parts of the intellectual 
pursuit. It is this pursuit of wholeness that Bloom feels education ought to seek, to 
educate the whole person, not some segmented portion of him. This, accordingly, 
ought to be wrapped up in seeking the good, which he draws from the Republic by 
Plato as one of those who seeks truth.  
 In Book I of the Republic, Socrates reminds his audiences that “the argument 
concern no ordinary topic, but the way we ought to live.”62 The question bequeathed 
to this realm of though is to resolve what the aim of education ought to be. The 
weight of this is in a two-fold sense: first, to think of human beings as such (in 
general) and secondly, how the subject ought to live (how I ought to live). The 
second sense ought not be confused with the first, more basic sense. Because the 
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subject is a human themselves, that is to say in the category ‘human,’ they must 
answer how a human ought to live first. Then, in their own: beliefs, background, 
social, and historical setting answer how they themselves ought to live. On this point 
Chris Higgins states that:  
Modern values-talk would make it seem as if rival answers to Socrates' 
question could rest comfortably side by side. In fact, it matters very much to 
use whether family, friends, neighbours, and public figures hold different 
views of the good life. What appears to be moral relativism is often the 
scrupulous practice of a specific virtue, namely tolerance.63 
 
However, the problem again arises when two value claims come in contact with one 
another. The ubiquitous and abstruse nature of tolerance affirms all views as having 
equal value claims, but concomitantly denies all claims. This is to say; by affirming 
intellectual diversity one also affirms contradictory claims (those that are both true 
and false at the same time and same respect). By including all claims, one also 
excludes all one, and all, from the same rational community. It is to ignore the basic 
differences between worldviews as if they were trivial and thus devalues all 
communities (including one’s own).  
 To answer Socrates’ question of ‘how one ought to live’ it necessarily implies 
examining the differing worldviews and their claims upon what the good is. The 
three persons just covered have given us a fundamental, if not universal, condition 
that men find themselves within. From Adorno, Hofstadter, and Bloom one can 
conclude that pragmatism is a view that permeates throughout this epoch, but ought 
to be examined. In order to do so I will begin by way of giving an overview of a few 
differing views of a ‘good’ education.  
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Education as Care 
In order to begin answering the question –what is a good education?–one 
needs to understand to what education might be aiming and why it is that they need 
education. From an etymological understanding, “educate” refers to the ‘training of 
animals,’ that stems from the word educare, ‘to bring up, rear, educate.’64 The training 
of animals and care, leads us back to Kant who spoke of education as doing both.  
Kant’s care in education as bringing one from the animalistic nature to 
human nature through discipline helps us to perceive care: 
An animal is already all that it can be because of its instinct; a foreign 
intelligence has already taken care of everything for it. But the human being 
needs his own intelligence. He has no instinct and must work out that plan of 
his conduct for himself. However, since the human being is not immediately 
in a position to do this, because he is in a raw state when he comes into the 
world, others must do it for him.65 
 
This portion of education, on Kant’s account, is a merely a negative thing. It is 
keeping him from his animal nature, whereby he might bring harm to his being. 
Therein opens the possibility for instructions that is the positive portion of 
education.  
In the instructional phase the student goes through a process of moralization 
through which they carry titles like: mature, intelligent, intellectual, well read, erudite, 
etc. Though, what these terms mean is often obscure. Only through the process of 
becoming critically aware of the end education seeks and the views and questions 
that necessarily lead to such a position can one begin to discern how and if the 
students are being cared for. Recalling Aristotle one cannot avoid talking about the 
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good when speaking of means and ends. Therefore, I propose this notion of care: 
care as seeking the good for the other.   
First, education presupposes the notion of care that seeks the highest good 
for a being. Humans come into the world ignorant and have the aspiration not leave 
life the same. All education seeks to avoid the exemplary case of King Lear; we seek 
to become wise before becoming old. The only grounds from which are applicable 
to critique educational aims are in terms of the good. Responding to the debate, 
which Hofstadter said is marked by “criticism and bitter complaints,”66 others make 
the audacious claim that opposing theories of education do not care for students 
only assumes one is justified in making that claim. For instance as explicated later, 
Giroux and Horowitz (Chapter 3 – The Modern Debate) believe this of one another, 
and historically the antithetical positions covered thus far. It is not that there is a lack 
of care within their theories, but rather a lack an awareness of their teleology as if 
there were none or as if theirs were axiomatically true. 
Adam Phillips brings psychoanalysis and education together by saying that 
one should be careful in thinking they are caring for the pupil because if they think 
they are educating when in reality they are in fact not, then they are doing more harm 
than good.67 This is a warning that should cause us to thoroughly examine our 
assumptions. Like a doctor that takes an oath to care for their patient, the teacher 
takes a solemn vow to do no harm to the child. Certain pedagogical practices will 
necessarily lead to a heightened awareness and incline educators toward a particular 
end. In Plato’s Gorgias, the point is made that man never stands to stand, rather there 
                                                
66  Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, 310 
 
67  A. Phillips, Equals Basic Books, 2003. 
 
 27 
is always a standing towards an end.68 Education is able to reinforce or alter the 
direction toward which one is predisposed in both formal and informal ways.  
Furthermore, Phillips invokes a salient point, “the child can only be taught 
what he wants to know."69 He can learn facts about life and recite them, "he can 
become a person that 'knows' such things - but it won't much matter to him. He will 
realize that to be a suitable member of society he has to be a person with the facts of 
life up his sleeve."70 Therefore, education also becomes care for the other in that it 
seeks to awaken, or make space for becoming aware of what one ought to care 
about; that is, the good. What the child comes to value and believe is the good is 
what they will desire to learn. Anything else, according to Phillips, they will 
memorize and become in a type of Machiavellian manner. 
In education there is always a moment of liberation. Persons can be more or 
less ready and open to being liberated, based upon their view of the good and 
willingness to self-examine. Take Plato’s Cave for instance. When the liberated 
individual comes to free his friends, he attempts to do so through trying to make 
them aware of their state of being, on that is harmful to them. His fellow cave 
dwellers attempt to challenge his knowledge through shadow games. Of course, not 
being accustomed to them any longer, he loses. The same is true in every pedagogical 
moment there is an instance of attempting to free the other from perceived bondage. 
In educational vocalic, that is to educate or bring to maturity. However, taking into 
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account Phillips’ warning about ‘thinking’ one is doing education, or being educated 
leads to the question: is the educator really liberating people or keeping them bound? 
Returning to the first notion of care, whether it be explicitly stated or 
implicitly stated there is always teleology in education. As Socrates explicates, “when 
we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the idea that it is better to walk, 
and when we stand we stand equally for the sake of the good.”71 That is to say that 
the practice and theory of education both have a goal in mind, one that I will seek to 
elucidate in and through the lens of Critical Pedagogy. 
Method 
Despite the similarities that could be drawn between the philosophies 
outlined above, I want to ask the question: towards what end are they educating? 
One blatant difference is the difference in notions about the goodness of mankind 
between Rousseau and Locke that fundamentally changed their means, and therefore 
the goal of education. To do so one must first recall age-old wisdom. Confucius and 
Socrates, both attempted to get to the essence of a thing in order to understand it. 
For example Confucius spoke of the rectification of names when he mentioned: 
If language is not correct, then what is said is not what is meant; if what is 
said is not what is meant, then what must be done remains undone; if this 
remains undone, morals and art will deteriorate; if justice goes astray, the 
people will stand about in helpless confusion. Hence there must be no 
arbitrariness in what is said. This matters above everything.72 
 
In the pedagogical context if one is to say they care for students, and speak as those 
who genuinely do care, yet by not understand their pedagogical aim can they with 
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integrity say they do care? Hence, the need to understand what the aim of education 
is in order to speak of it in a proper sense.  
 Secondly, returning again to Socrates he reminds us to continually be self-
reflective. Socrates began his unpopular career of philosophy by following a 
prophecy from the Oracle at Delphi who said he was the wisest man alive. Through 
his journey he questioned the artists, politicians, and craftsmen to see if they knew 
what the good was and discovered all thought they knew, yet did not. Socrates 
questioned their uncritically held assumptions, and was killed for doing so. It is 
through this same means of questioning the uncritically held assumptions of 
education that this project will begin to illuminate the positions from which 
educational theories originate and toward what they aim. In this current project 
examining the formation of the work becomes necessary to understanding the work 
itself and its beliefs. Though this work is primarily philosophical it is heavily 
influenced by Raymond Williams and Cultural Studies. 
Cultural Studies began with one of its founders, Raymond Williams’ work in 
adult education. Williams began gained a particular focus on the ordinary way or life 
from his days growing up in a rural Welsh-farming village at Pandy in 
Monmouthsire, which stood four miles outside of the border with England.73 It was 
there that Williams’ understanding of ‘culture as a way of life’ began to emerge. From 
this focus upon the ordinary Williams, after the WWII was over, focused upon the 
education of workers. 
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While working in the Worker’s Educational Association Williams’ formulated 
much of what would later become the project of Cultural Studies. Williams always 
wanted to bring literature and drama closer to the everyday life of the laymen.74 
Williams was particularly interested in the working class with its values, its collective 
democracy, its solidarity, and potential for making a better society.75 His particular 
focus upon pedagogy is explained in the following realization:  
it deepens the extent of the study of culture and power by addressing not 
only how culture is produced, circulated, and transformed but also how it is 
actually negotiated by human beings within specific setting and 
circumstances.76  
 
Pedagogy becomes the site for the re/production of power and ideology, and along 
with Williams’ focus on “culture as ordinary” this was fertile ground for Williams’ 
work.  
‘Culture as ordinary’ was meant to convey that in the ordinary is where 
meaning is made. The work of culture, as the site where meaning and values were 
made was, for Williams, the primary force of society.77 Moreover, it is in the ordinary 
that one’s meanings and values are always challenged.  
Culture is ordinary: that is the first fact. Every human society has its own 
shape, its own purposes, its own meanings. Every human society expresses 
these, in institutions, and in arts and learning. The making of a society is the 
finding of common meanings and directions, and its growth is an active 
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debate and amendment under the pressures of experience, contact, and 
discovery, writing themselves into the land.78 
 
For Williams, culture included two important aspects: “the known meanings and 
directions, which its members are trained to; the new observations and meanings, 
which are offered and tested.”79 When it came to pedagogy Williams said that:  
Education is ordinary: that it is, before everything else, the process of giving 
to the ordinary members of society its full common meanings, and the skills 
that will enable them to amend these meanings, in the light of their personal 
and common experience.80 
 
Williams saw that education ought to be used to give that sense of common, or 
shared meaning in society; not job training, or skills. For Williams education, for all, 
becomes the driving force behind a democracy that enables all citizens to take part in 
the making of meaning and values that their culture shares.  
 Democracy according to Williams was not the representative democracy that 
is found in today’s democracies. By democracy he means “popular power: a state in 
which the interests of the majority of the people were paramount and in which these 
interest were practically exercised and controlled by the majority.”81 This sense of 
socialist democracy is in contrast to the representative democracy that is now seen in 
the West. This concept of democracy seeks equality in of persons as against relations 
that produce qualitatively different inequalities.  
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Education, for Williams, was not then taken in a popular sense of a minority 
educating the majority but all having an equal voice in education. This comes out of 
Williams’ understanding of the common good. Williams began with the idea that it 
was the duty of the government to make sure that its citizens could think.82 That 
education was to prepare students “to make sense of change, to adapt to change, and 
to shape change.”83 Williams felt that only through an education that grasped the 
meaning of the ordinary, common meanings, would the students be able to adapt 
and shape change for themselves. Furthermore, that this education could only do so 
by educating all persons so that they could partake in democracy.  
Popular education, in any worthwhile sense, begins from a conception of 
human beings which, while recognizing difference of intelligence, of speed in 
learning, and of desire to learn which is clearly affected by difference of 
environment, nevertheless insists that no man judge for another man, that 
Everyman has a right to the facts and skills on which real judgment is based, 
and that, in this sense, all education depends on the acknowledgment of an 
ultimate human equality.84 
 
This was to say, that education must be rooted in a deep sense of solidarity for the 
other and not upon superfluous national or economic interests.85 
Drawing heavily from Williams’ insight into education will be necessary not 
only to understand Critical Pedagogy but also to understand where to begin a critical 
education.  Before this project lays a considerable challenge because analyzing the 
formation and basic beliefs of pedagogical practices is a difficult project due the 
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tapestry or web of ideas that influences every aspect of that work.86 It can be hard to 
trace the root of such projects due to factors of inconsistent and unconscious 
influences.87 In addition to this, tracing the philosophical roots adds to this difficulty.  
 I will be pulling from Cultural Studies in the area of intervention within 
cultural practices.88 These cultural practices are often seen in ‘simple’ ordinary 
instances of struggles of power and discourse within the everyday. Education 
particularly works within this project being that its essence is homologous. In other 
words, education is an intervention through discourse in relations of conceptual 
powers within the ordinary way of life and interpretations that seek to social 
transformation through the liberation of the self.89 Cultural Studies in education 
therefore brings together the work of Williams and other thinkers like Gramsci and 
Freire. These thinkers interweave theories of power and ideology in education in a 
way that reveal the presuppositions underlying Critical Pedagogy.  
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Chapter 2 
AN OVERVIEW OF CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 
I will begin by examining the works of the founder of Critical Pedagogy, 
Paulo Freire and his main work Pedagogy of the Oppressed.90 Additionally, Critical 
Pedagogy grew and changed with thinkers who will need to be touched upon such as 
Ira Shor, Peter Mclaren, and Henry Giroux. To assist in framing this work I intend 
to draw upon the work Seehwa Cho in her summation of Critical Pedagogy.91 Cho 
summarized three projects of Critical Pedagogy as being, the project of experience, 
project of anti-system, and project of inclusions. Furthermore, she expounded upon 
three politics of Critical Pedagogy as culturalist, self/identity, and grassroots.  
Thus far philosophical influences in the education landscape and a brief 
understanding of a teleological education have been explicated.  In this section I now 
undertake the task of delving more into the particulars of Critical Pedagogy. In this 
part I set out to define Critical Pedagogy and understand its conceptions of the good. 
To do so an account will be given of the various rhetorical tropes that are used by 
Critical Pedagogy theorists redress. Then, this analysis will focus upon notable 
figures such as Paulo Freire in whom Critical Pedagogy finds its beginnings and 
Henry Grioux whose work is highly influential in the field today.  
Defining Critical Pedagogy 
 Defining the term ‘Critical Pedagogy’ is a problematic task that even theorists 
within the field have difficulty doing. One of the difficulties is, “critical pedagogy is 
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an evolving field, and it is by no means unified.”92 Differing practices within the field 
make it difficult to solidify what Critical Pedagogy actually entails. Therefore, in the 
effort to be fair to this conceptualization of the field I will draw upon the words of 
those in the field to define it. As the reader might notice, I am using Critical 
Pedagogy as a proper noun, whereas the field uses it is as a noun. What is to follow is 
a defense of that, because Critical Pedagogy holds commonly held assumptions that 
other educational theories do not such that it can be named as particular field.  
 Beginning with the work of theorist Seehwa Cho who, in her recent article 
“Politics of Critical Pedagogy and New Social Movements,” has done an excellent 
job in mapping the theory both in its goals and presuppositions. Of critical pedagogy 
Cho says: 
At its core, critical pedagogy has the following two major agendas: 
transformation of knowledge (e.g. curriculum) and pedagogy (in a narrow 
sense, i.e. teaching). The most significant focus of critical pedagogy is the 
relationship between knowledge and power. By asserting that knowledge is 
intrinsically interwoven with power, critical pedagogy adamantly and 
steadfastly dismisses the mainstream assumption of knowledge as objective 
and neutral.93 
 
A unifying theme of Critical Pedagogy is that power is interwoven in practice and 
knowledge claims. Nothing is without this notion of power, especially knowledge.94 
Everything contains ideology that brings with it the notion of non-neutral 
propositional knowledge that; either extrinsically or intrinsically, dismisses certain 
groups while advancing others. Interwoven in Critical Pedagogy is the Marxian class 
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struggle in association with meaning making. Therefore, it stands as Critical 
Pedagogy’s agenda to make these claims known. Thus, “Critical pedagogy refers to 
the means and method that test and hope to change the structures of schools that 
allow inequalities.”95 “That is, as a form of engaged practice, Critical Pedagogy calls 
into question forms of subordination that create inequities among different groups as 
they live out their lives.”96 Affirming the goal of equalizing power inequalities in 
educative practice/curriculum, Giroux adds:  
Pedagogy represents both a mode of cultural production and a type of 
cultural criticism that is essential for questioning the conditions under which 
knowledge is produced, values affirmed, affective investments engaged, and 
subject positions are put into place, negotiated, taken up, or refused.97 
 
Critical Pedagogy is essentially a poststructural, postmodern, multicultural, 
pedagogical movement whereby relations of power and language are analyzed and 
changed by both teachers and students. This results from emphasis on the primacy 
of the will over the primacy of reason in Philosophy. Therefore, the form and 
content of pedagogical authority becomes the site of a struggle to understand whose 
epistemic framework is legitimated in practice.98 
 Cho’s summary defines Critical Pedagogy in terms of its project and politics. 
Cho differentiated three projects: the experience, anti-system, and inclusion. The 
three politics are: the culturalist, self/identity, and grassroots.99 This framework can 
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be used to conceptual understanding Critical Pedagogy. Though this is a difficult 
task, Cho’s framework will allow for a sophisticated lens through which to address 
Critical Pedagogy’s theories and practices.  
Experience 
 The project of experience aims at “freeing students from oppressive cultural 
frames of knowing by providing them with new ways of claiming authority for their 
own experience.”100 This project is in reaction to the seemingly hegemonic discourse 
that presents itself as universal and necessary truths. This can be understood as a 
distinction between being and becoming. Critical pedagogy attempts to reconcile the 
social construction of history and culture with the hegemonic ideologies of this 
present epoch. Therefore, experience is often necessarily redressed in light of this 
postmodern understanding. Yet, what is meant by experience and how to claim one’s 
one authority are what is debated within the field. However, the tacit focus of the 
field is upon the re-casting of students’ experience. The following are a few accounts 
of the conceptualizations of experience from critical pedagogy scholars Barry Kanpol 
and Ira Shor. 
 Barry Kanpol reflects upon his experience in modern public education by 
highlighting the following themes within modern education: male dominance, 
sexism, fear, cheating, competition, stereotyping, authoritarianism, economics, the 
public, and teacher accountability.101 Kanpol believed that tests were created against 
certain sexes, teachers took their authority for granted and pushed it upon kids and 
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use of fear to control the classroom these practices resulted in prevalence of cheating 
amongst students and a lack of accountability amongst teachers. From these 
experiences in education Kanpol seeks to alter this state of affairs by allowing 
students to be co-creators in the educational process and challenge the norms of 
education. One way of doing that is by giving a greater significance to the student’s 
own experiences as being valid over and against a teacher’s prescription of validity. 
 Ira Shor, posits that education ought to be “orienting subject matter to 
student culture—their interests, needs, speech, and perceptions—while creating a 
negotiable openness in class where the students’ input jointly creates the learning 
process.”102 Students’ experience becomes the authority in the classroom and 
teachers’ acumen in their particular field is often subverted, or reoriented to also 
include the students. For Shor, current teacher-centered models of education are too 
competitive and encourage negative feelings due to the surveying of people’s 
differences and the lack of success for some over and against the privileged few. 
In contrast to what is viewed as a typical education, marred by what Kanpol 
and Shor described, the critical education seeks not to deny competition, but have a 
democratic cooperative learning whereby the students garner optimistic feelings 
about their potential and future. Students become persons whose voices are worth 
listening to, whose minds are capable of serious intellectual contribution, and whose 
thought and feeling can garner the transformation of society.103 This is set in contrast 
to what the critical educator sees as engendering boredom within the classroom that 
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discourages education through rote memorization of ‘facts,’ rather than this 
participatory model. These ‘fact’ based models build educative practice on the 
assumption that there is a given, objective reality, whereas the participatory model 
sees the world as open and manifest before the subject. 
Perhaps the most salient piece to arise from this reconceptualiztion of 
experience is its effect on the perceived authoritative of the teacher. In other words, 
this delineation of experience has major effects one’s concept of pedagogical 
authority within the teacher/student relationship. In this next section, these 
implications will be drawn out in much more detail through Paulo Freire’s 
explication of the educator/educatee relationship. It will become clear that Freire 
sees teachers and students as co-educators in a dialectic relationship that seeks to 
negotiate and renegotiate authority. This is a theme that will be a consistent thread, 
woven through the present critique of Critical Pedagogy. 
As will be shown, Critical Pedagogy moves toward “equality” in 
opportunities and outcomes based upon their understanding of experience. Turning 
now to Ideology and Curriculum in order to show how, according to Critical Pedagogy 
scholars, there is always ideology embedded within practices that are thought to be 
neutral. Michael Apple argues that there is both explicit and implicit ideology behind 
any curriculum.104 Jean Anyon builds upon Apple’s work in order to identify high-
status symbolic capital like artistic, intellectual, linguistic and other skills that were 
developed in creative and more autonomous manner than traditional middle-class 
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educative settings.105 It is here that Apple posited: schools “ultimately help produce 
the type of knowledge (as a kind of commodity) that is needed to maintain the 
dominant, economic, political, and cultural arrangements that now exist. I call this 
‘technical knowledge’ here.”106 However, Apple saw that ideology stood behind 
curriculum. These ideologies, attempting to pass themselves off as skills were 
however inherently moral ideologies.107 Apple linked this phenomenon to Antonio 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Taking from Gramsci Apple conceives hegemony 
as the meaning and practices that prevail over and impose ideology that is given, 
lived, and not questioned.108 This, according to Critical Pedagogy, works to 
reproduce inequalities in terms of opportunity as well as results. Therefore, 
subjective experience becomes the only meanings through which one can escape and 
make a place from which to begin counter-hegemonic dialogue about existing 
hegemonic norms.  
This idea of experience as being authoritative, hegemony being linked with 
curriculum, and the desire for a more equal democratic state begs the question: what 
is meant by “equality?” Is there room for the talents and abilities inherently given to 
persons to flourish under this education, or will they be brought to have the same 
outcomes as others? Are the values, or ideologies informing an individual, groups of 
persons, cultures, and civilizations inherently rational? Is it also the case that in some 
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systems of belief, persons or groups are excluded on the basis of such frameworks 
belief? Can the poor have a better life than the rich? Can they be richer in meaning 
because of their struggles? Are there beliefs and values behind the actions of society 
and teachers in education that ought to be engaged with rather than dismiss as sexist 
or racist? Can one even engage, rationally, with them?   
Project of anti-system 
 The project of the anti-system assists in understanding the removal of 
authoritative figures in pedagogical practices. Since reality is no longer given or 
objective it must be negotiated; hence subjective experience is seen as the only 
legitimate form of authority.  In building upon the validity and newly found authority 
of one’s own experiences, Critical Pedagogy reconceptualizes authority in the 
classroom. Critical Pedagogy stresses the ideal of an educational praxis whereby 
students and teachers are seen as equals. This kind of practice presupposes a 
postmodern, poststructual, Foucauldian concept of power, in which no knowledge is 
neutral, but power must to be located and resisted.  
Therefore, Critical Pedagogy becomes problem-posing in its methods. Rather 
than a top-down model of a teacher that passes knowledge to the student, teaching 
becomes dialogical. Thus, as Ira Shor states, “the problem-posing approach views 
humans beings, knowledge, and society as unfinished products in history, where 
various forces are still contending.”109 There is always room for negotiating: this is 
not to say that such bodies of knowledge like science, math, etc are not formal 
bodies, nor does it take out the educational background of the instructor. Rather, 
critical education seeks to see that, “existing knowledge is not presented as facts and 
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doctrines to be absorbed without questions.110 Therefore, it becomes of the utmost 
importance to account for social/economic, class, race, gender, religion, nationality, 
and other cultural backgrounds of the students and teachers. This is in the attempt to 
recognize that students already bring their own understanding of the world and lived 
experience with them, thus having a valid of claim upon knowledge as much as their 
teachers do. 
 In seeking to conceptualize the project of anti-system Kanpol’s distinction 
between authority and authoritarianism is useful. Kanpol believes that 
authoritarianism, which schools currently employ, is based upon arbitrary structures 
of authority. As a result, teachers often abuse their power unethically and resort to 
coercive means of persuasion. Contrastingly, Kanpol’s conception of authority is 
based upon a dialogical reciprocity between the knowledge of the teacher and 
student that challenges oppressive hegemony seen in race, gender, and class 
stereotypes.111   
 This is furthered still by Shor’s concept of participatory education. Based 
upon Piaget’s epistemic position, as a derivative of action, “to know an object is to 
act upon it and transform it . . . to know is therefore to assimilate reality into 
structures of transformation and these are the structures that intelligence constructs 
as direct extension of our actions.”112 Concomitantly, this is drawn from a Dewidian 
conception of experience in education as that with which one does, a person suffers 
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or undergo the consequences of their experience.113  Thus, Critical Pedagogy posits 
students ought to create their own meaning and not be told what to think or where 
to find meaning, but meaning is to be found within the dialogical process in which 
students and teachers engage. Meaning becomes negotiated and representation; 
based upon language and experience. Meaning ceases to be the discovery of some 
objective truth that sees the world as it is. Rather, meaning is actualized through 
language as the Derridian infinite play upon differences. 114 
 As a counterexample, Shor finds various practices in modern pedagogical 
institutions that serve as instances of anti-dialogical practice. Lectures and summaries 
on subject matter, coaching advice to students during an exercise, taking attendance, 
doing analysis ahead of and without students all are examples of anti-dialogical 
practices. All of which seek to impart knowledge rather then dialogically coming to 
understanding through co-equal student/teacher participation. Contrastingly, the 
dialogical teachers: avoid jargon or obscure allusions that intimidate students into 
silence; pose thought provoking/open-ended problems to students so that they feel 
challenged in thinking them through, and seeks equal participation for minority 
students.115 These practices are based on the assumption that, “for general education, 
students should experience relevance, subjectivity, and provocative debates in an 
area, not orthodoxies of information.”116  
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 Given these statements by Critical Pedagogy about the non-neutrality of 
education can it be said that any practice is neutral? Apple argued, rather effectively, 
that they could not be. How can decisions between one system over another be 
made? Can the choice between one be justified, or must they merely be picked at 
random? Recalling Aristotle again it can argued that no action is arbitrary but based 
upon beliefs and values and the conception of the good. Therefore, the question 
becomes what is the good, and what does Critical Pedagogy consider it to be?  
Project of Inclusion 
 Formally stated the project of inclusion is, “the guarantee of equal 
opportunity and equal power for the underprivileged, oppressed, marginalized, or 
subjugated is the ultimate goal for this project.”117 The project of inclusion is an 
attempt to cross the ideological borders that garner competition and non-
multicultural tendencies within students through the non-critical presentation of 
‘facts.’ 
Ideologically this places Critical Pedagogy as antithetical to individual success 
at the expense of others persons. Kanpol makes a distinction between individuality 
and individualism to further this concept. Individualism sets up values of persons 
based upon what they do or how smart they are. Individuality rather takes into 
account the background and cultural origins of the individual. 
Critical pedagogy is a cultural-political toll that takes seriously the notion of 
human differences, particularly as these differences relate to race, class, and 
gender. In its most radical sense, critical pedagogy seeks to unoppress the 
oppressed and unite people in a shared language of critique, struggle, and 
hope to end various forms of human suffering.118 
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Kanpol builds upon Herbert Mead’s work to say this is realized through the 
empathetic role taking of the other.119 Which is accomplished only by virtue of being 
in a shared world with shared communication, i.e., dialogical education.120 
 Shor speaks of racial inequality in educational praxis resulting in economic 
disadvantages that are a result of a lack of educational opportunities.121 Shor sees 
equal access to college degrees as necessary in order for the gap between minority 
students and majority students to close. This is because knowledge and naming the 
world in the dialectical allows for oppressed persons to become unopressed through 
understanding.  
Since the project of inclusion seeks equality in opportunity and outcome do 
they have necessary presuppositions that will maintain and engender equality? If 
there is not fixed meaning, if meaning is only grounded in class distinctions and 
persons can be alienated from meaning as a result,122 then in what basic sense are 
men equal, what does it mean to be human? Finally, if educators continue to build 
upon Rousseau and Marx that posit: to change inequalities society must change, yet 
systems of meaning are behind these inequalities does blaming or changing the 
system do any good? Critical Pedagogy, as I will later show, even abandons this 
systematic attempt to change society.  
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Politics of the Culturalist 
 The culturalist project is set in contrast to the typical Marxist theorists’ focus 
on economy. The focus is rather upon inequalities within and through 
representations of class, culture, subculture, hegemony, ideology, language, discourse, 
and representations of knowledge. This places the focus, as Shor indicates, upon 
situations such as unequal funding, inadequate staffing and facilities, and weak 
curricula—all decisions that were made from above.123  
 This stance is vehemently against capitalism. According to Kanpol, capitalism 
is seen as a form of competition that devalues human life by allocating them to 
devalued positions due to quantifiable tests such as IQ.124 Thus, Critical Pedagogy 
attempts to undercut this ‘devaluing’ of the human life to end alienation and 
subordination through the recasting of language and discourse as a means by which 
all persons have access. Furthermore, Kanpol believes that, under capitalism schools 
would remain unsuccessful in addressing problems of inequalities because inequality 
is built into the capitalist system.125 This is due to understanding capitalism as being 
based upon the Darwinian survival of the fittest that presupposes inequality to 
subsist.126 This is further recognized as a reaction against instrumental rationality as 
opposed to substantive rationality. Carlos Torres draws this distinction from 
                                                
123  Shor, Empowering Education: Critical Teaching for Social Change, 115 
 
124  Kanpol, Critical Pedagogy: An Introduction, 184 
 
125  Semel, Foundations of Education: The Essential Texts, 8 
 
126 Carlos, Alberto Torres, “Schooling, Power, and the Exile of the Soul,” in Ideology, 
Curriculum, and the New Sociology of Education: Revisiting the Work of Michael Apple, ed, 
McCarthy and Dimitriadis, (CRC Press 2006), 50. 
 
 47 
Raymond Morrow and David Brown Critical Theory and Methodology.127 Instrumental 
rationality is efficiency of the means realizing given ends (values) where efficiency is 
based on calculation and expertise. Substantial rationality refers to ultimate value 
claims and cannot be based on formally rational procedures at all.128  
 Once again it can be seen that the salient theme emerging of the non-
neutrality of knowledge that leads to various forms of alienation and/or oppression 
being rooted in different conceptions of the good (the end). Under this guise—
where instrumental/practical rationality is made to look like or be the only 
substantive rationality—in modern education the Critical Pedagogy theorist attempts 
to understand and intervene in knowledge representations by challenging students’ 
experiences and norms. For example, Shor, cites a study from Bigelow and 
Christensen about Columbus’s discovery of America to explicate this position of 
questioning ideology and representation.129 Shor begins by asking students in the 
classroom: ‘if you take something and claim you discovered it does that make it is 
yours?’ They all respond, ‘of course not.’ Then they use that to elucidate how 
Columbus is portrayed to have discovered America when there were already people 
living there. Students then came up with new vernacular terms for what they 
think/felt Columbus actually did, “ripped off”, ‘invaded it,” and “conquered it.”130 
All in all they wanted students to question: why is it like this and how can I make it 
better? Perhaps, for Shor and others, the recasting of Columbus in history takes away 
the privileged position of the Spanish empire’s ‘discovery’ of the Americas.  
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 Thus, it can be see how Critical Pedagogy attempts to question given norms 
that are portrayed as facts or common knowledge through the redressing history or 
given facts. This practice attempts to alleviate suffering or alienation in certain 
individuals or people groups. In the Columbus example this was or can be used to 
alleviate the oppression of American Indians.   
While it is important to question and redress false dogmas that are presented 
to us, it is of utmost importance how this is done; by what means the beliefs ought to 
be tested or examined. Once again, if nothing is neutral, from where does one 
begining to raise questions? Must another paradigmatically replace one worldview; 
are worldviews incommensurable?  After all, how does one know for certain that 
they are not doing more harm than good in their redressing of history? 
Unbeknownst to the teacher, scholar, laymen or whoever is doing the 
redressing/questioning, history itself is now under suspicion, according to this 
theory, and it only gets continually re-casted depending on the particular worldview’s 
narrative. Only through a theory that available to all and able to make judgments 
between views could this problem of a relativity of worldviews be solved.   
Politics of self/identity and grassroots 
 Cho saw that after the Soviet experiment had failed to garner results in the 
class struggle for equality that institutional change was abandoned. After the 1956 
invasion of Hungary and Prauge it became clear that economic class struggle was a 
failure. By the 60’s the class struggle had become unrealistic and unpopular. Then, in 
the 70’s and 80’s the Third World saw they could not catch up with the modern 
world. It became, to the Left, a lost hope to attempt to improve the human 
condition or solve social problems systematically. Therefore, the focus shifted: 
 49 
Critical pedagogy emerged against the structural determinism of the Neo-
Marxist theories of education in the 1970s and 80s. It shifted its theoretical 
and political projects to re-discover the human agency, which has been all 
but denied or woefully ignored in structural determinism since Althusser131 
 
Rediscovery human agency became necessary to redistribute power at all levels, 
beginning with the individual’s emancipation. No longer was it merely a work of 
recasting society. Rather, Critical Pedagogy became focused upon the individual’s 
recasting of their experiences and education.  
 Subsequently, Critical Pedagogy moved to a form of power that began to 
conceptualize authority as fundamentally dialogic consensus. They abandoned social 
change and began to look at change as localized and grassroots; bottom up not top 
down. This marked a shift of tactics away from the political to the educational and 
personal levels.  
 It should be added that this grassroots, individualistic movement of 
Postmodernism and Critical Pedagogy wanted to move away from the 
Enlightenment ideal of unity. Carlson and Dimitriadis say this of unity: 
Postmodernism begins with a critique of all discourse of unity, and of an 
authoritative, unified, "objective" truth, associating unity with antidemocratic, 
authoritarian projects that attempt to erase difference. In place of the trope 
of unity, postmodernism valorizes the trope of chaos and disorder, of 
difference that cannot be brought together under a "whole," of truth that is 
always partial, contested, and positional.132 
 
Yet, there seems to be a paradox with this kind of Critical Pedagogical thinking. Is 
unity better or disunity? Apple indicates that unity, at least in share meaning and 
action through curriculum is not inherently bad but, an ideal societies strive to 
accomplish. Apple states that, “this commitment to maintaining a sense of 
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community, one based on cultural homogeneity and valuative consensus, that has 
been and remains one of the primary, though tacit, legacies of the curriculum 
field."133 It is when hegemony through the use of scientific and technological 
language causes oppression, alienation, or bases itself off technocratic rationality that 
this idea of unity becomes suspect. This, according to Apple has been characteristic 
of attempts to solve a value/political problem through a systems approach 
influenced by science and technology.134 Rather, Apple implores us to engage in 
ethical and political debate guided by “philosophical analysis dealing with modes of 
moral reasoning and valuative argumentation.135 
 If Apple is correct and curriculum is a form of garnering a common meaning 
in a person and amongst persons a conception of unity that also brings equality 
amongst persons and allows all persons to participate together is necessary. This 
theory necessarily needs to presuppose common ground between persons and 
building upon pervious points assist in choosing between and distinguishing 
different worldviews.  
Paulo Freire 
 Many of these ideas, particularly that of oppression, that have been covered 
have been shared by various theorists that ascribe to Critical Pedagogy. Yet, in 
talking about this subject, it is necessary to provide a space for Paulo Freire. Freire is 
prominent figure in Critical Pedagogy and from whom many ideas arise. Therefore, it 
is imperative to further explicate his ideology in order to understand why Critical 
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Pedagogy implements practices and ideological forms. In order to understand Freire 
I begin at the beginning of his career. 
 Freire began his journey in Brazil teaching and attending law school. He was 
a middle class man without a concern for being in poverty. Through a conversation 
with a young struggling dentist the course of his life was drastically altered. The 
dentist had taken out a loan too large to manage by himself and was in need of 
money to buy his instruments in order to practice. All the while, he was desperately 
trying to provide for his family. Feeling unequipped to assist this man in his 
endeavors and yearning to make an impact upon others like this struggling dentist, he 
quit law and decided to focus on education and began to write Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed.136 
 Later, while presenting dialogical concepts, which would appear in Pedagogy of 
the Oppressed, about how more dialogical loving relationship between parents and 
children in place of violent punishment was necessary Freire have another such 
encounter.137 After one lecture, a worker stood up and addressed Freire. This man’s 
comment eventually helped Freire to focus his course of action: 
‘Dr. Paulo, sir—do you know where people live? Have you ever been in any 
of our houses, sir?’ And he began to describe their pitiful house. He told me 
of the lack of facilities, of the extremely minimal space in which all their 
bodies were jammed. He spoke of the lack of resources for the most basic 
necessities. He spoke of physical exhaustion, and of the impossibility of 
dreams for a better tomorrow. He told me of the prohibition imposed on 
them from being happy—or even of having hope.138 
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This man then showed Freire that, though the doctor lived a nice life and read nice 
books, he did not understand the marginalized. On the topic of violence to their 
children the man went on to tell Freire that while the doctor might come home to 
bathed kids who are not hungry, are clean, and dressed—it was another thing to 
come home to children that are starving, bedraggled, and unkept. “If people hit their 
kids, and even ‘go beyond bounds,’ as you say, it’s not because people don’t love 
their kids. No, it’s because life is so hard they don’t have much choice.”139 This lack 
of hope moved Freire so much that this encounter helped his taxonomy of class 
knowledge in understanding the oppressed. 
 This and other events in Freire’s life started him down a path of engaging 
with literacy in marginalized people groups, particularly the illiterate. “Freire did not 
promote literacy for its own sake, but saw it rather as bringing about the 
democratization of culture among the rural and urban illiterate in Brazil.”140 This 
fight for literacy became Freire’s legacy and subsequent reason for exile from Brazil. 
In a system where one could only vote if one was able to read, Freire overturned the 
whole electoral system. In Pernambuco his movement moved the literacy rate from 
800,000 to 1.3 million.141 With the subsequence socialist/communist awakening in 
Brazil that destabilized the country, Freire became guilty by association of the revolt 
and was exiled to Chile. It was there that his main work Pedagogy of the Oppressed was 
formed.  
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 To summarize the vastness and complexity of Freire’s work I am going to 
propose the following points and explicate each of them in order. Each concept 
holds a salient theme in Freire’s work: the oppressed, critical consciousness, dialogue, 
and freedom and authority. 
The Oppressed 
Freire begins with a conception of dehumanization as a historical and 
ontological problem facing humanity. For Freire, it was dehumanization brought 
upon others through ideological oppression that often, if not always, resulted in 
physical oppression.142 One of the basic elements of this dehumanization directed 
toward the oppressed was/is through prescription. In this reality, the oppressor sees 
himself and others as things, not persons. According to Freire, the prescriptions 
“represent the imposition of one individual’s choice upon another, transforming the 
consciousness of the person prescribed to into one that conforms with the 
prescriber’s consciousness.”143  
Paul Taylor best explicates oppression in Freire’s pedagogical framework. 
First, the individual deprived of dialogue is oppressed. Second, dialogue is the 
process and practice of liberation. Third, the individual engaged in dialogue is 
liberated. Fourth, dialogue by definition, requires more than one first. Fifth, more 
then a single person can be called a society.144 It is by depriving the other of dialogue 
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that one becomes oppressed; persons are transformed from subjects to objects. 
Thus, it is through dialogue that one can be emancipated from oppression, which 
necessarily occurs within the politics of culture. 
The struggle for Freire is for freedom from the prescription of the 
oppressors that can only come through the oppressed themselves. This is because, 
“the oppressor, who is himself dehumanized because he dehumanizes others, is 
unable to lead this struggle.”145 Yet, those in the struggle for freedom from 
oppression battle against a duality within themselves. At one point wanting freedom 
yet afraid of it due having internalized the consciousness of the oppressor’s 
prescriptions within them have paralyzed the oppressed so as they are unable to 
actualize emancipation.   
In this duality Freire sees the oppressed as having fatalistic attitudes. This 
attitude is almost always exemplified in what is seen as inevitable forces that work 
against freedom. The oppressed see, fatalistically, that “their suffering, the fruit of 
exploitation, as the will of God,” or in another way, that it is just how society is.146 
The oppressed further this attitude through self-depreciation. They see themselves as 
lacking knowledge and say “the ‘professor’ is the one who has knowledge and to 
whom they should listen.”147 They fail to see that they know things and they are 
amidst a struggle to become more fully human. They must see the struggle is not 
simply a struggle that begins with hunger, but that the struggles is to become human 
beings, not merely objects.  
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Freire believes this struggle against oppression can only come through 
teaching and developing a critical consciousness through revolutionary leadership.148 
The pedagogy that reveals this oppression therefore attempts to do so through 
bringing the person to understand or see their self-determined ability to recast their 
human agency, rather than define their humanity based upon an objective system of 
rationality. 
Critical Consciousness  
In order for one to escape the oppression, Freire posits what can be called 
critical literary or critically consciousness. One can understand critical consciousness 
by understanding that to which it is opposed: the banking model of education. By 
understanding the banking model of education the critical consciousness can be 
defined. 
Banking education takes the world as motionless, static, compartmentalized, 
and predictable.149 The world is seen as being full of facts, such as four times four 
equals sixteen, or the capital of Arizona is Phoenix. This model then reaches into an 
ethical life and tells how students how life is or should be, rather than assisting them 
in understanding it themselves. Under the banking guise, education becomes 
“depositing” rather than learning. “The teacher issues communiqués and makes 
deposits which the students patiently receive, memorize, and repeat.”150 According to 
Freire, this neglects the fact that students have knowledge about the world:  
Implicit in the banking concept is the assumption of a dichotomy between 
human beings and the world: a person is merely in the world, not with the 
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world or with others: the individual is a spectator, not re-creator. In this view 
the person is not a conscious being; he is rather the possessor of a 
consciousness: an empty ‘mind’ passively open to the reception of deposits 
of reality from the world outside.151 
 
Thus, the banking methodology of educational praxis is anti-dialogical in that is 
places ideology upon students rather than examines it alongside them. Yet, due to 
the presupposition of an objective, unchanging world where “facts are facts,” there is 
no need for dialogue juxtaposed with mere memorization.  
“Contrastingly, authentic thinking, thinking that is concerned about reality, 
does not take place in ivory tower isolation, but only in communication.”152 That is, 
conceptions of reality are communicated in dialogue. “Changing language is part of 
changing the world. The relationship, language-thought-world, is a dialectical, 
processual, contradictory relationship.”153 This understanding of dialogue leads to, 
according to Freire, a restoration of the subjective understanding of humans and sets 
in relief conceptions of power.  
Therefore, the essential goal of a critical consciousness becomes 
transforming reality through dialogue.154 This transformation occurs through non-
acceptance. Nothing is given, nothing is unquestionable; there is no sacred. Critical 
consciousness becomes a paradigmatic shift in the way the individual sees the world 
around him. Necessarily, this leads to a rejection of the idea of the banking model’s 
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form of knowledge as facts to be memorized and discovered.  Rather, knowledge is 
to be grasped through dialogue with others.  
Yet, almost paradoxically, Freire is following in the footsteps of the 
Philosopher René Descartes. Freire is attempting to understand the reality that 
cannot be doubted. In Freire’s literacy campaigns he believes in naming the world as 
a form of critical consciousness. Freire is “asking the learner to confront the 
complexities of the whole word, the whole world of reality, through ‘naming their 
world’.”155  
Though the claim can be made that this once again leads to the banking 
model of education Freire cuts that claim off. In his problem-posing form of 
education, leading to a critical consciousness, the teacher and student are working 
together to discover the world. Together with the student the teacher creates the 
conditions where conceptions of knowledge are superseded by knowledge at the 
level of logos.156 This problem-posing model of education seeks to create an 
emergence of consciousness and critical intervention in reality rather than a 
submergence through the presentation of facts to be regurgitated.  
 It is through this dialogical form of education alongside the student that 
critical consciousness is realized. The world becomes open to them and hegemony 
can be deconstructed. Upon Freire’s account, critical consciousness that occurs 
through dialogue is presupposed by: hope, integrity, faith, humility, and love.157 In 
order to understand how dialogical education can unoppress persons it will be 
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necessary to understand what Freire, and by extension Critical Pedagogy theorists 
mean by dialogue. 
Dialogue: Hope, integrity, faith, humility, and love: 
Dialogue cannot exist without love. “Love is at the same time the foundation 
of dialogue and dialogue itself.”158 The act of love is being committed to the cause of 
the other, to their liberation and emancipation. Without love one cannot, according 
to Freire, enter into dialogue. Love is an act of intervention and courage for the 
other and for oneself against oppression.  
Alongside love, Freire sees humility as a necessary part of dialogue. Humility, 
in this sense, can be understood as seeing that one’s self does not contain the whole 
of truth. It sees others are partners in this world and as equals. “Self-sufficiency is 
incompatible with dialogue.”159 Humility is seeing one’s self as a part of the greater 
whole of humanity and as always being with others in the world. It is not opposing 
others or marginalizing others. Therefore, it is willing to listen to others’ thoughts, 
which results in genuine dialogue.  
“Faith in people is an a priori requirement for dialogue; the ‘dialogical man’ 
believes in other even before he meets them face to face.”160 Faith to Freire is, 
understanding the possibility of both alienating the other and liberating them. The 
dialogical person takes up the challenges of liberation in the face of alienation 
because of the possibility and hope that lies with the other.  
                                                
158  Ibid., 89 
 
159  Ibid., 90 
 
160  Ibid., 90 
 59 
Dialogue with love, humility, and faith produces an environment of trust. In 
the environment of trust, according to Freire, a closer partnership of naming the 
world can occur. This environment of trust is contingent upon integrity and honesty 
between two persons and “it cannot exist if that party’s words do not coincide with 
their action.”161 For Freire, attempting to promote democracy while silencing or 
marginalizing people is to not have integrity. 
 Furthermore, dialogue cannot exist without hope. “Hope is an ontological 
need.” 162  For one to struggle without hope is frivolous and ends in fatalism and 
pessimism about reality. Freire finds hope in the unknown struggle for the future, 
“when the future is a given, then there is no hope. There is no room for struggle or a 
utopia.”163 Without hope in the midst of the struggle against oppression, hope is 
pointless. It is denying the struggle one of its necessary conditions. The hope Freire 
finds amidst the struggle is in tolerance and an egalitarian future where all persons 
are treated equally. It is important to note that his hope is rooted in a form of critical 
consciousness that creates hope.  
Freedom and Authority 
 Freire works out the role of the educator in a critical education as one who 
instills hope in the student. Yet, this occurs under the Freireian dialogue between the 
educator and the educatee where the goal is the emancipation of the individual. So, 
as a result, there remains an interesting dichotomy. To teach a student is to impose 
or deposit, given knowledge into the educatee, thus a form of oppression; yet, the 
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role of the educator always already stands above the educatee. What then becomes of 
the role of an educator when all knowledge is related to power and oppression, what 
can be taught?  
To attempt to escape this quagmire Freire bases pedagogical authority in 
dialogue, and given his prior aversion toward the banking model (hegemony) of 
education this is the only way for him:   
We also run the risk of either of denying freedom the right to assert itself, 
thus exacerbating the role of authority; or else of atrophying the latter and 
thus hypertrophying the former. In other word, we run the risk of 
succumbing to the seduction of tyranny of liberty, or to the tyranny of 
authority, thus acting at cross-purposes, in either hypothesis, with our 
incipient democracy164  
 
Therefore, authority based upon a mutual respect between the teacher (educator) and 
the student (educatee) as partners within the dialogue is the way by which the binds 
of oppression can be broken. As Carlson and Dimitriadis indicate, Freire’s builds 
upon Marxist discourse in a way that helps the marginalized and oppressed people 
overcome the ideology that besets them and tells them they cannot think for 
themselves, are undeserving, and therefore dependent upon the “master.”165 By 
recasting knowledge, authority, and freedom in dialogue, Freire recasts the desired 
dynamic between teacher and student.  
Going further, Freire proclaims, “it is impossible to democratize the choice 
of content without democratizing the teaching of content.”166 Thus, is born the 
dialogical approach of educational praxis whereby the student-teacher relationship is 
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based upon equal footing. “Through dialogue, the teacher-of-the-students and the 
students-of-the-teacher cease to exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student with 
student-teachers.”167 In this dialogical problem-posing education teachers become 
learners along with the students as much as the students become instructors along 
with the teachers. “In this process, arguments based on ‘authority’ are no longer 
valid; in order to function, authority must be on the side of freedom, not against it.”168  
Instead of pedagogical practices in which the teacher prepares a lecture a 
head of time the dialogic teacher would do examination of texts along with the 
student. It would then appear that the only way for a teacher in a problem-posing 
form of education to have any ‘authority’ over the students would be as a result of 
the acumen they have gained from years of study in their field. Yet, even acumen can 
still not be held over the students because students are seen as likely to have just as 
much insight into the subject of study. That is to say, the dialogical teachers in 
understanding the interconnectivity of dialogical practices will not be able, or ‘ought 
not’ hold any forms of authority over the student in a way that becomes hegemonic. 
Thus, to Freire the teachers who do not continue to study and better themselves are 
no longer qualified to be teachers; they have deprived themselves from the 
wherewithal to be a teacher.169  
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Henry Giroux 
 Henry Giroux is a prominent thinker in modern Critical Pedagogy and 
Cultural Studies. In the 70’s and 80’s Giroux brought together the work of Freire, the 
cultural capital of Pierre Bourdieu, the radical democratic work of Aronowitz, and 
the Frankfurt School’s critical theory.170 From this amalgamation of ideas he returned 
to the roots of Cultural Studies found in Raymond William’s notions of adult 
education. There he attempted to expose the use of education to reeducate America 
away from the liberation movements during the Regan era.  
In the 30s and 40s Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams founded Cultural 
Studies. Williams’ work was mainly focused around that of adult education and the 
idea of culture as an ordinary way of life.171 This inherently made a move away from 
modernity that Giroux would later expand upon in his work in Critical Pedagogy and 
border crossing.172 In the following section I will attempt to contextualize Giroux’s 
work in his move away from modernity to border pedagogy constituted within 
Postmodernity which itself rejects universality, reason, and a grand narrative of 
history.173 
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Postmodernism, according to Giroux, ‘rejects the universal, any claim to 
transcendental, rejects reason as the universal claim on human affairs.” 174 Within 
Modernity, reason was held in high regard and became associated with scientific 
rationality, which is inherently positivistic. This signals Morrow and Brown’s 
distinction, covered earlier, between instrumental and substantive rationality.175 Due 
to the resulting atrocities seen in Auschwitz, the modernist conception of reason and 
science has been rejected as the result of the rise of oppression and subjugation. 
Postmodernism rejects positivism in its attempts to be predictive and mechanistic in 
its orientation toward the future. This rejection of universality and reason for the 
Postmodern becomes a rejection of reason as having a transcendental or ontological 
status within human affairs.  
Another characteristic of social modernism is the epistemological project of 
elevating reason to an ontological status. Modernism in this view becomes 
synonymous with civilization itself, and reason is universalized in cognitive 
and instrumental terms as the basis for a model of industrial, cultural, and 
social progress.176 
 
For postmodernists if reason stands as it was in modernity it denies the reality of 
difference and struggle for a better future. Instead of the Postmodern notion of open 
and manifest, Modernity holds that history is determined. Thus, as Freire states, for 
some this denies hope for a better future.  
 This is furthered in a rejection the idea of a historical narrative, continuity, or 
goal set forth in history.  By rejecting the primacy of reason as the foundation from 
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which humans might relate and/or come to know the world the narrative of Hegel, 
Marx, or Kant are subsequently rejected as well. Contrastingly:  
Post modernism not only views the subject as contradictory and multilayered: 
it rejects the notion that individual consciousness and reason are the most 
important determinants in shaping human history. It posits instead a faith in 
forms of social transformation that understand the historical, structural, and 
ideological limits that shape the possibility for self-reflection and action . . . 
points to solidarity, community, and compassion as essential aspects of how 
we develop and understand the capacities we have for how we experience the 
world and ourselves in a meaningful way.177 
 
Furthermore, that the "grand narratives do not problematize their own legitimacy 
rather, they deny the historical and social construction of their own first principles 
and in doing so wage war on difference, contingency, and particularity."178 This 
furthers the point that nothing is given, all is historically and socially constructed and 
therefore open for critique and change.  
 It is important to note that Postmodernity is responding to a certain conception 
of reason as governed by positive science.  Positivism is historically arising from a 
conception of reality that is a priori knowable through the senses. In this framework, 
it is believed that what cannot be verified through the senses cannot be known. This 
is particularly the form of reason that many scholars (such as Adonro) are 
responding to, which is thought to have constituted modernity and resulted in the 
Holocaust. Therefore, the harmony of postmodernism as, “if there is any underlying 
harmony to various discourses of postmodernism, it is in their rejection of absolute 
essences" ought to be understood in light of this context of sense experience.179 
Furthermore, these modern pedagogical practices became – “an irrational rationality 
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marked by an emphasis on prediction and technical control” that is constituted by 
Freire’s conception of Banking Education.180 
 In light of the response to positivist discourses, Postmodernity 
reconceptualized language.  
Postmodern discourse has retheorized the nature of language as a system of 
signs structured in the infinite play of difference, and in doing so has 
undermined the dominant, positivist notion of language as either a genetic 
code structured in permanence or simply a linguistic, transparent medium for 
transmitting ideas and meaning.181 
 
This is to say, that language is both given and knowable, or that language is a system 
of signs and symbols whereby meaning is socially constructed. In this socially 
constructed sense the critical educator must uncover this meaning of differences in 
social reality. Education becomes the site where subjectivities are produced and 
maintained, cultural hegemony and construction of dominant and subordinate 
ideologies through the use of language. Therefore, Giroux proposes a radical 
pedagogy that allows us to understand how these understandings or ideologies are 
formed in the complex web of social constructions.  
 From this Giroux enumerates the notion of border pedagogy, which allows 
students and teachers to understand their experiences in relation to culture, history, 
and politics.182  
Border pedagogy is attentive to developing a democratic public philosophy 
that respects the notion of difference as part of a common struggle to extend 
the quality of public life. It presupposes not merely an acknowledgment of 
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the shifting borders that both undermine and reterritorialize different 
configurations of culture, power, and knowledge.183 
 
Border pedagogy calls for recognition of epistemic, political, cultural, and social 
margins that structure the language of history, power, and difference. It wants to 
create a space for otherness to be understood and new identities to be created in 
existing power relations. It makes known the historical and social construction 
inherited that frame discourse and language. Furthermore:  
border pedagogy necessitates combining the modernists emphasis on the 
capacity of individual to use critical reason to address the issue of public life 
with a postmodernist concern with how we might experience agency in a 
world constituted in difference unsupported by transcendent phenomena or 
metaphysical guarantees.184  
 
Border pedagogy follows the way of Postmodernity, by seeing the world as open to 
human creation, will, and power. In so doing, border pedagogy puts its hope in 
creating new horizons of knowledge.  
 In Giroux’s rejection of the modernist presuppositions the question of 
meaning arises. What are these new horizon’s of knowledge? Like postmodernism 
the salient question of nihilism arises once foundations of universality, a given 
metaphysics, or future states such as those explicated by Kant, Hegel, or Marx are 
abandoned. In response Giroux turns to Laclau, which is worth restating here: 
It leads, rather, to a proliferation of discursive interventions and arguments 
that are necessary, because there is no extradiscursive reality that discourse 
might simply reflect. Inasmuch as argument and discourse constitute the 
social, their open-ended character becomes the source of a great activism and 
a more radical libertarianism. Humankind, having always bowed to external 
forces—God, Nature, the necessary laws of History—can now, at the 
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threshold of postmodernity, consider itself for the first time the creator and 
constructor of its own history.185 
 
Thus the primacy of experience and the will arise to place man, not in any given 
sense, but seeing an opening up of one’s vistas to new possibilities. Through the 
rejection of deterministic forces such as God, Nature, or History Giroux has instead 
placed argument and discourse. The question then becomes has he truly escaped 
metatheory or simply posited a new one?  
 With this in mind, it is possible to situate Giroux’s move towards 
institutional and social critique rather than philosophical epistemic critiques. In a 
Rousseauian way, (presupposing the goodness of man, the primacy of the will, and 
social activism) border pedagogy attempts to create new objects of knowledge and 
address how inequality, power, and human suffering are rooted in institutional 
structures.186 Furthermore, in its pedagogical practices, border pedagogy goes against 
the grain of transmission teaching that do memorization and surveying of texts 
without critical analysis.  
Therefore, "it is imperative that such a pedagogy acknowledge and critically 
interrogate how the colonizing of differences by dominant groups is expressed and 
sustained through representations in which the humanity of the other is either 
ideologically disparaged or ruthlessly denied."187 These differences can often be made 
through the uncritical acceptance of texts as privileged without critically examining 
the power structure behind them. Thus, border pedagogy has three goals: (1) to 
understand how the production of meaning is related to affective investment and 
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production of pleasure, (2) how students placed in and take up different economic 
needs and rethinking them, and (3) that popular culture be seen as a legitimate 
phenomenon to be analyzed as a primary force in shaping students’ stand point.  
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Chapter 3 
A PLACE TO BEGIN 
 To better understand Critical Pedagogy I will show what their goals are and 
how and if those goals match up with their presupposition. In order to set up and 
differentiate this analysis I will begin with the modern setting. Recalling part of the 
first section’s focus on the telos of education I will examine David Horowitz and 
Henry Giroux’s differences on education and how these differences in light of their 
not dissimilar goals bring this debate to a stalemate. Ultimately, I will draw critical 
education back to Immanuel Kant’s and Jurgen Habermas’ understand of the 
transcendental to realize what a critical education ‘ought to be.’ In what follows I 
want to conclude: 
1. Divisions about politics assumes divisions at a more basic level 
2. A critical education should get to more basic level divisions (and establish 
common ground) 
3. Critical Pedagogy does not get to the more basic level due to its 
assumptions (nor establish common ground) 
4. Therefore Critical Pedagogy’s assumptions cannot stand as a substantive 
form of critical education. 
5. Furthermore, Worldviews are way of making sense and giving mean to 
the world around us  
6. A critical education tests various worldviews for meaning  
7. Critical Pedagogy makes sense of the world around us through the 
Postmodern worldview 
8. The Postmodern worldview must be tested for meaning and cannot, 
because of its presuppositions, be the grounds from which meaning is 
tested. 
9. The only means from which to test other views for meaning in through 
what is transcendental.  
 
The Modern Debate 
 Horowitz and Giroux, though never exchanging words, do exchange 
ideological blows with one another. Giroux is not explicitly mentioned in Horowitz’s 
writings, however the Critical Pedagogy/Critical Theory position from which Giroux 
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comes is; cultural studies, critical studies, etc. Giroux, on the other hand does 
explicitly mention Horowitz’s and his conservative position in his own writings by 
vehemently denouncing him. Therefore, I will examine some of this conflict so as to 
reveal more basic differences between the two parties that influence their view of 
education.  
 I first begin with Horowitz. Horowitz began as a member of the communist 
party and is now a passionate speaker against left leaning political movements. 
During his time on the left, his writings received favorable reviews and were never 
highly criticized by his colleagues.188 However, it would appear now that Horowitz is 
an out spoken conservative in the academy that sees education as needing to rid itself 
of what he claims is indoctrination by the Left, that he is high criticized. Particularly, 
Horowitz believes many study areas (e.g. cultural studies, whiteness studies, post 
colonial studies, global studies, justice studies) have been shaped by a-political view 
points and represented as canon to students.189 Rather, he would prefer that 
professors, under the auspices of academic freedom and personal acumen, instruct 
students to be critical thinkers as opposed to indoctrinating them.190 On this he says: 
Professors have every right to interpret the subjects they teach according to 
their individual points of view. This is the essence of academic freedom. But 
they also have professional obligations as teachers, whose purpose is the 
instruction and education of students, not to impose their biases on students 
as though they were scientific facts. The professorial task is to teach students 
how to think, not to tell them what to think. In short, it is the responsibility 
of professors to be professional – and therefore "academic"— in their 
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classrooms, and therefore not to require students to agree with them on 
matter which are controversial.191 
 
Horowitz maintains that the only type of pedagogical practice that ought to occur in 
the classroom is that of academic vigor, not an impositions of their particular points 
of view.  
 This has resulted in Horowitz writing books such as 101 Most Dangerous 
Professors, and other such titles to warn unaware students of the dangers of 
indoctrination. This kind of audacity resulted in him getting booed off stage and 
lambasted by leftist academics for attempting to push his conservative ideology upon 
academia.192 All the while, according to Horowitz, he wants to simply engender 
professionalism in the classroom rather then indoctrination or politics, be it from the 
left or right. He finds the attacks upon him are unfortunately focus on his character 
rather than his ideas. He has claimed that he does not wish to get left-wing 
professors fired nor make them give equal time to “crackpot views, like those of 
Holocaust deniers.” He simply desires the removal of controversial political views 
that have little to do with their fields of study from the classroom curriculum and 
talk.193  
One of the most controversial moves Horowitz has made is the publishing 
of his Academic Bill of Right (ABOR) and the subsequent adoption of it by various 
universities.194 In the controversial ABOR Horowitz seeks to have a space that is free 
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for inquiry.195 That is free from political ideologies or biases. For students he wants 
to protect them from ready-made opinions on issues that have not yet been 
adequately challenged or debated. For professors, that they be protected from 
politics with hiring and appointment.196 Furthermore, that the classroom ought to be 
conducted in a professional manner and opinions political, religious, or otherwise 
ought to be left outside or opposing viewpoints made known whereby the student’s 
naïveté and intellectual immaturity might not be taken advantage of.  
 This position seems proper given the posture of academia with the focus 
upon academic freedom that was mentioned in the beginning by Cole. Cole 
mentioned similar threats from within and without against academic freedom such as 
dogmatism and politics that pervade academia.197 However, once Horowitz began to 
implement this bill of rights extreme controversy ensued. In Colorado the bill was 
adopted with partisan compromise. Subsequently, however he was denounced by the 
print media in Colorado by such tag lines as “witch-hunter,” or being likened to Mao 
Zedong who persecuted professors for not touting the party line.198   
 These views though do not appear prima facie in contrast to what has been 
covered in the examination of Critical Pedagogy. Horowitz wants to protect the 
academic freedoms of professors and students from ideas that are given to them as if 
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they were ‘truth.’ Recalling the positions of Critical Pedagogy as dialogical and 
Freire’s decry of banking education, it can be seen that these ‘goal’ are not entirely 
dissimilar. However, it ought to give us pause because Henry Giroux denounces this 
position. 
Henry Giroux for example, believes public schools are under attack from 
neo-conservatives, religious fundamentalists, and hard-core right-wing ideologies 
because they (schools) have the potential to teach skills, knowledge, and values that 
necessarily make a more democratic public by making power and knowledge an 
object of dialogue and engagement.199 This for Giroux will undermine the Right’s 
power and ideology. Horowitz stands as the exemplar for those ideological positions. 
Giroux claims that, despite Horowitz’s claim that the ABOR is politically neutral, he 
is backed by and often supports Right-wing ideology, thus he is not neutral; he has 
an agenda.200 
Notable here is that both Giroux and Horowitz place political ideologies as 
the crux of the future of academia. Giroux cites Horowitz as actively pushing for 
state and federal regulations that impose political quotas on higher education by 
making conservative ideology a basis for hiring.201 Horowitz does agree with allowing 
more conservative appointments in the academy because he believes by advocating 
for ideological diversity that shares in the national political landscape these diverse 
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idea can be worked out.202 Horowitz claims that the leftist ideologies “are sectarian 
attempts to subvert both (heritage and culture) – by deconstructing the nation’s 
identity and by diving its communities into warring classes, genders and races—into 
victims and oppressors.”203 As shown Giroux, and Critical Pedagogy in general, make 
a stand against this position by virtue of its purportedly neutral top-down stance. 
Therefore, Horowitz’s critique of this position does, at the least, not apply to Critical 
Pedagogy.  
Each side desires academic freedom and critical inquiry, yet their political 
stances are antinomies. Giroux responds to Horowitz’s position by citing various 
occasions of one-sided critique and bias on Horowitz’s side against any left-oriented 
political positions.204  Yet, almost paradoxically Giroux himself says, “balance in the 
current attack on higher education is used as a rhetorical tool by right-wing 
conservatives and Christian evangelicals whose worldviews are dominated by fixed 
dualisms and an ideological rigidity that resents questioning.”205 For both sides, 
represented by Horowitz and Giroux, the debate remains at a political level of: right 
vs left; Christian vs non-Christian; communism vs capitalism. These apparent 
antinomies do not help to come to understand which should chosen, if in fact these 
are the only choices. 
What has been brought to the forefront is that practical reason is useless. 
Both sides see that mere job training is less than ideal. Horowitz and Giroux both 
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have stances that knowledge is not neutral or given. It must be tested. Both sides 
stand against rote memorization and dogmatism and, instead, wish to engender free 
and critical inquiry in schools. If anything can be thought of as common ground 
between these two, that can. Despite this ‘agreement’ there remain bitter divisions 
amongst these groups and persons. Giroux and Horowitz leave the debate at an 
impasse. These divisions, if they are to ever overcome in order to work together, 
must addressed at a more basic level.   
In order to understand how education stands as a type of care for one’s being 
and what a critical education is by understanding presuppositions, I want to explicate 
various philosophers’ works. This will shed light on the debate between Giroux and 
Horowitz by bringing to the foreground if there are more basic points that ought to 
be addressed first and foremost.  Can the academic future be fixed solely upon 
political ideology such as conservative or liberal, or is the debate and conflict at a 
level of understanding presupposed by each? Giroux believes that the academy is to 
challenge our worldviews, to unsettle our position, to think critically, but not to 
merely acquire skills for a job.206 Horowitz also believes in the process of 
understanding all positions, as there is a multiplicity of views.207 Both of these men, 
who stand in for their particular positions are quintessential examples of advocates 
for academic freedom, but from different political/ideological positions.  
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Return to Philosophy 
Much of this current debate stems from one that took place between Locke 
and Rousseau.  Is the state and society, or the human condition to blame for 
suffering and moral evils (Rousseau) or does man have responsibilities for his/her 
circumstances (Locke)? To bring this further into the debate in education, this comes 
back to the fundamental question: what is it to be a human? Does man have an 
inclination towards selfish pursuits or virtuous ones? Is there a state apparatus 
needed to help us be good (Locke), or would it be better for us to be free from 
societal constructions and constraints (Rousseau)? If Rousseau is correct then 
changing societal circumstances is imperative to obtaining the good. But, the social 
construction of reality implies this idea too was socially constructed. However, if 
Locke is correct and men do not do what is good and need civil order to govern 
them, then changing the circumstances will only put different corrupt persons into 
power. What could possibly free man from this inner corruption about which Locke 
speaks? This brings back to the assignment of discerning the most basic aspect of 
human beings. Is it the will and power (such as Critical Pedagogy posits)? Is our 
most basic feature connected with a certain conception of rationality? Or, is there 
nothing transcendent in our being; is nothing assumed that makes all else possible? 
The answer to this question is paramount in determining the ‘ought’ in education. 
As it currently stands, Critical Pedagogy looks at the cultural/social 
background factors of our human personality as the basis for equality/human 
rights.208 If men are equal then simply referencing subjective experiences as the basis 
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for democratic equality breaks down. If one, like in Auschwitz or Aba Ghraib, 
decides some persons are not equal, how can subjectivity point out the error? Only 
through coming to understand how it is all persons experience is always already 
interpreted and engaging at that level this goal be reached. This further necessitates 
understanding our understanding as the ontological basis that is qualitatively true and 
applies to all persons. In order to do so, I go back to Kant where he attempted to 
explicate the transcendental in reason as that which is common amongst all and then 
working in Jürgen Habermas to further understanding the transcendental.    
Turning to the topic of the transcendental it is necessary to turn to Kant. 
Kant stands as one of the most prominent philosophers of modernity that 
championed reason. “Kant was a virtual titan of philosophy, with absolutely 
enormous influence upon subsequent philosophy and theology.”209 His motto, ‘dare 
to reason’ stood as the slogan of the Enlightenment. If Critical Pedagogy is going to 
abandon Enlightenment rationality and appeal to subjective experience as the basis 
for understanding then, Kant’s arguments must be thoroughly examined.210 This is 
not to say one should take the whole of Kant as correct; his work is still in need of 
critique. However, Kant tacitly applies because of his work in moral philosophy (that 
with which education is chiefly concerned). Kant, furthermore, provides an 
alternative to the presented spectrum of rationality with which Postmodernity has 
left us (i.e. technological or meditative, objective or subjective). From Kant, I will 
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explicate two important concepts: that ethics for humanity must be universal and 
there must be some transcendental.211 This is not to ignore the critiques of Kant’s 
ethics that have followed or ignore his distinction between practical reason and pure 
reason. Rather, this is to build presuppositionally from what is most basic (i.e., by 
asking is there something transcendental?). Upon this ground Kant’s work becomes 
salient and examining his argument as a dichotomy to what Critical Pedagogy has 
posited as nothing is transcendental.  
Kant explicates the necessity of the universality of morality in his piece 
Metaphysics of Morals. The universality of morality is salient to our present topic 
because of the highly lauded equality that is sought in pedagogical practices.212  
Furthermore, democracy assumes that this equality must be rooted in common 
ground. Therefore, to obtain equality in democracy, common ground must 
necessarily be established. Rational/logical common ground must be found amongst 
rational beings. People do not offer a horse, a chair, or water the right to vote; only 
rational beings are able to vote. If reason cannot be called upon to establish common 
ground then equal rights cannot be guarantee in either the public or private realm. 
Kant posits that, if the law is to have moral force, it must be rooted in the nature of 
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man. Furthermore that human nature must be qualitatively known, not 
quantitatively/empirical known.213  
Human nature cannot be merely empirically grounded.  Human nature 
requires the conceptual understanding of the word human nature, i.e., one that is 
grasped and applies to all within that category. Empiricism, by virtue of dealing solely 
with the external sense experience, when consistently held, leads to nominalism. 
Nominalism denies natures and sees words with no corresponding reality. When, and 
if, applied to human nature, would undermine any sense of universal (all within that 
class) equality of humans. Taking a practically example of how this is problematic 
can be seen through the work that has already been mentioned from Adorno.  
At first glance the skeptic might reply that pragmatism does not need to 
appeal to any principal of universality. Yet, recalling Adorno’s that the chief-end of 
education is that the mass murder of others never occurs again leaves the skeptic in a 
problematic position. Either it is the case that the action of the Nazi’s is rational and 
thus propositional or that it defies propositional truths and cannot be argued for or 
against. That is to say, without communicative rationality such ethical problems that 
must be solved become impossible because no party in the debate is able to validate 
their moral claims.  
Without philosophy based upon the reason, or the Logos, the moral law 
becomes unknowable.214 This Logos that governs the world is what Freire was 
attempting to ascertain in his own way; through a critical consciousness. Both Kant 
and Freire can be seen to say that, morality properly conceived governs all 
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(universally) moral/rational beings. If morality, according to Kant, is not applicable 
to all moral beings then it is in no way a moral law, therefore to claim an ethical 
maxim (the ‘ought’) is utterly meaningless because it only applies to a select few. .215  
To state ‘thou shall not steal’ as a moral law assumes equality amongst those 
under the law. If one is not equal to the other the law does not apply. An animal is 
not held in the same regard as the human that steals, but only is a human stealing 
guilty of breaking the civil law. American democracy, begin with the claim that all 
men are equal.216 Though this is rooted in a metaphysical position that was taken as 
self-evident and has been challenged since, the flow from metaphysics to ethics 
should not be abandoned too. It is important to not confuse positive law, that which 
is arbitrary like driving on the right side of the road, with moral philosophy and 
education. Education already assumes those being educated are equally rational (able 
to form concepts, judgment and arguments), and that rationality constitutes our 
common ground. If someone undermines this common ground, and is thus 
inconsistent with democracy, it ought to be rejected as an undemocratic form of 
education. Furthermore, it is no less dogmatic to assert a form of education without 
justification that guarantees equality by basing this upon the grounds empirical sense 
data, i.e., subjective experience. Critical Pedagogy has attempted to accomplish this 
by rooting equality in the subject’s personal experience. The problem arises though 
in how to get outside of one’s own experience and what occurs when contradicting 
interpretation of the same experience arises. To recall Adorno again, this becomes 
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the case when the West attempts to stop Nazi Germany. One side (Allies) see the 
Jews as humans the other (Nazis) see the Jews as non-humans. Human suffering 
requires all persons to participate in discourse whereby validity of morality is tested 
with others. Human suffers as radical as Auschwitz requires that humanity, not local 
bodies alone (in a mono-tradition) participate in discourse.   
In so far as one participates in the communicative community, or the life 
world, there must be dialog with others about ethical maxims.  In this modern era 
our world has expanded such that communication with other countries and 
ideologies is necessary. If Kant is correct and morality must be applied to all persons 
then the processes of validating maxims must benefit all persons and be justified. 
From this Habermas derives his understanding of the principal of universalization 
(U): 
All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s 
interests (and these consequences are preferred to those known alternative 
possibilities for regulation).217 
 
And his principal of the ethics of discourse (D): 
Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the 
approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in practical discourse.218 
 
From here Habermas presupposes that validation of norms is possible otherwise 
moral discourse becomes superfluous. Furthermore, ethical arguments cannot take 
place in a monological fashion but must take place dialogically. In this dialog all 
interlocutors can, after much discussion, reach a common will that is expressed in their 
agreement with one another. This must be the case because, as Habermas indicates, 
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persons must be open to criticism by others’ needs and wants.219 Since ethical claims, 
according to Kant and Habermas, all presuppose (U) all must be able to participate 
in the discourse. Every moral statement forces one into a yes or no position. Thus, 
justification in dialog is necessary in so far as one participates in the practical 
discourse.  
Where Kant limits himself is that he posits the necessary a priori of reason 
that is apart from human nature as the foundation for morality, not human nature as 
reason. Kant states: 
By this terminology one is directly reminded that moral principles are not 
grounded on the peculiarities of human nature, but must be subsistent a priori 
for themselves; but from them human practical rules must be derivable, as 
for every rational nature.220  
 
Although Kant does say, “moral laws are to be valid for every rational being in 
general, to derive them from the universal concept of a rational in general.”221 It is 
not surprising that Postmodernity responds to the Enlightenment rationality as being 
disjunct from humanity and goes the way of skepticism. Only by rooting morality 
within what is common amongst mankind can morality, in any universal and 
necessary sense, survive. What Freire seems to capture is this notion of the Logos in 
man that leaves the world open for him to know, or name/understand. 
Though Kant’s categorical imperative can remain valid only when thought of 
in relation to the good, as that which all persons can will. The duty-for-duty’s-sake 
approach breaks down in determining which duties one ought to do and 
universalizing them. The categorical imperative “would be that which represented an 
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action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e., as objectively 
necessary.”222 If, instead of duty, this is posited as the good, then once again morality 
could be established as universal and necessary. But, only if the good is knowable. All 
of ethics then stands as a hypothetical imperative to the one categorical imperative, 
i.e., discerning the end of happiness. That is, discerning that which brings lasting 
happiness: the summun bonum, the good.  
By understanding understanding in relation to the good critical education be 
better understood. By looking at what Critical Pedagogy sees as understanding and 
comparing that to Kant it can be seen which is sounder (in terms of rational 
justification). In comparison to Kant, Critical Pedagogy’s view of language and 
understanding attempts to claim that there is no transcendental and no universal. 
There is no meaning behind a word; any word refers to various other words.223 The 
conventionality of the words is applied to concepts that too have become 
conventional. Concepts themselves are universal; they apply to all in that class that 
share those attributes and only those attributes. A concept is grasped. If there are no 
universals, then there are no concepts. This position is consistent with empiricism 
which itself if consistently held leads to nominalism.224 If all knowledge is from sense 
experience then there can never be a universal because one can never experience all 
instances. If there are no concepts then it can be rephrased, as nothing is knowable 
in itself, or that nothing has any essence. This it not to say that a particular cannot be 
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known rather, extrapolating from the particular to the universal becomes 
problematic. This would necessarily include humans and undermine any form of 
rational justification for ethics. In what follows I will defend this position via Kant 
and Habermas.  
Necessity of a Transcendental 
Kant begins with experience and shows how it is that there must be 
something transcendental, the quality of the transcendental. Kant posits that 
transcendental aesthetics is that which is concerned with space and time. Of space he 
says: 
Space is not a conception which has been derived from outward experiences. 
For, in order that certain sensations may relate to something without me 
(that is, to something which occupies a different part of space from that in 
which I am); in like manner, in order that I may represent them not merely as 
without, of, and near to each other, but also in separate places, the 
representation of space must already exist as a foundation.225 
 
Without space being a priori experience could not occur. There would be no object 
outside being with which to interact and have the phenomenon called experience. If 
it were the case people could not understand our being in the world because the 
conception of its bounds and limits would be impossible.  
 Furthermore time stands as an a priori necessity for the possibility of 
experiencing the world. This notion is not something that can be sought empirically. 
Rather, it is known through reflection.  
1. Time is not an empirical conception. For neither coexistence nor 
succession would be perceived by us, if the representation of time did not 
exist as a foundation a priori. Without this presupposition we could not 
represent to ourselves that things exist together at one and the same time, or 
at different times, that is, contemporaneously, or in succession. 
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2. Time is a necessary representation, lying at the foundation of all our 
intuitions. With regard to phenomena in general, we cannot think away time 
from them, and represent them to ourselves as out of and unconnected with 
time, but we can quite well represent to ourselves time void of phenomena. 
Time is therefore given a priori.226 
 
Kant here is arguing for a transcendental aspect of time. Without time given a priori 
experience and intelligibility as a finite temporal being would cease to exist. 
Attempting to argue against time would end in a contradiction in that the skeptic 
would, by virtue of their argument, assume they are in time (here and now). It can 
therefore be seen that, in our experience, there must be conditions necessary for it. 
Having shown how Kant’s conceptions of the necessity of the transcendental in 
experience a similar argument can be posited for a transcendental in understanding 
itself. Which is to say, that the transcendental is that with which a refuting is 
impossible because it is always already assumed in all that is said or done and stands 
in need of no prior justification.  
 Kant continues to press this idea of the transcendental in the area of logic. 
He establishes that it cannot be founded in experience. Rather, it is also prior to 
experience and necessary to understand experience.  
With the pure conceptions of understanding, on the contrary, commences 
the absolute necessity of seeking a transcendental deduction, not only of 
these conceptions themselves, but likewise of space, because, inasmuch as 
they make affirmations concerning objects not by means of the predicates of 
intuition and sensibility, but of pure thought a priori, they apply to objects 
without any of the conditions of sensibility.227 
 
This is to say, cognition applies to experience in order for sensibility to be possible. 
Without an a priori way of understanding experience then experience, which must be 
interpreted, will be rendered meaningless. Furthermore, according to Kant if one is 
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to deny the necessity of a transcendental then they wander about blindly and return 
to utter ignorance.228 Just as an infinite regress in experience is absurd so too is a 
regress in understanding. Understand based upon understanding based upon 
understanding ad infinitude has no meaning. I would be based upon my 
understanding of my teacher, which is based upon his teacher, ad infinitum; but no 
one actually having understanding. For example, if John owes Sally five dollars and 
write and I.O.U, but tells Sally that Joe will pay her from his I.O.U. that he has, and 
this goes on ad infinitum then Sally never gets paid. For another example take a 
theory, if theory A’s weight (truth) is based upon theory B’s weight, which it self is 
based upon theory C, ad infinitum there is no weight to theory A. The thing must be 
able to be examined in terms of something that allows for the examination, i.e., a 
transcendental. That which must be assumed for intelligibility to be possible 
otherwise as Kant states: 
He ought, moreover, clearly to recognize beforehand the unavoidable 
difficulties in his undertaking, so that he may not afterwards complain of the 
obscurity in which the subject itself is deeply involved, or become too soon 
impatient of the obstacles in his path; because we have a choice of only two 
things- either at once to give up all pretensions to knowledge beyond the 
limits of possible experience, or to bring this critical investigation to 
completion.229 
 
Kant leaves us with these options give up any understanding of concepts, essences, 
equality, rights, morality, and education or continue in the pursuit of understanding 
the nature of that which is transcendental.  
 Following in this same line of thinking as Kant, Habermas argues for the 
transcendental through the pragmatic presuppositions of practical discourse. To do 
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so Habermas uses Karl-Otto Apel’s argument against the Munchhausen trilemma. 
Habermas recalls that according to Hans Albert if one attempts to justify moral 
principals with universal validity they fall into this trilemma. It becomes the case that 
the person must put up with an infinite regress, arbitrarily break off the their point of 
deduction, or make a circular argument.230 In response Habermas states that: “it 
arises only if we presupposes a semantic concept of justification that is oriented to a 
deductive relationship between statements and based solely on the concept of logical 
inference.”231 Habermas then uses Apel’s argument against this position to defend 
the cognitivist. The main line of arguments for this falls under the performative 
contradiction. “A performative contradiction occurs when a constative speech act k(p) 
rests on noncontingent presuppositions whose propositional content contradicts the 
asserted proposition p.”232 Habermas uses the example of Descartes “Cogito ergo 
sum” argument as an example. If a speaker were to take upon the opposite position, 
“I do no exist” then, it is the case that the speaker has performed this contradiction. 
At time of saying “I do not exist” the speaker also affirms “I exist (here and now).” 
At this point Habermas makes one aware of the futile attempts at the deductive 
argumentation for validity of (U) and instead validates moral arguments via the 
pragmatic presuppositions of practical discourse, i.e., transcendental justification. 
That amounts to that which must be presupposed from the condition of the 
possibility of discourse. To question it become futile because it makes questioning 
possible.  
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 From practical discourse Habermas derives rules that transcendentally remain 
true in pragmatic discourse. From Aristotle he derives three levels of these 
presuppositions: the logical (products), the dialectic (procedures), and the rhetorical 
(processes). These rules for discourse are as follows:  
1.1 No speaker may contradict himself.  
1.2 Every speaker who applies predicate F to object A must be prepared to 
apply F to all other objects resembling A in all relevant aspects.  
1.3 Different speakers may not use the same expression with different 
meanings. 
2.1 Every speaker may assert only what he really believes.  
2.2 A person who disputes a proposition or norm not under discussion must 
provide a reason for wanting to do so. 
3.1 Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take 
part in a discourse. 
3.2 a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. 
b. Everyone us allowed to introduce any assertion into the discourse 
c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitude, desires, and needs. 
3.3 No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from 
exercising his right as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2).233 
Using these rules Habermas shows that within practical discourse these rules hold 
true and the denial of such leads to a contradiction. If one were to convince another 
via lies then they would not be breaking the 2.1 and by implication 1.1. Habermas 
likens the rules of discourse to that of a chess game. Whereas the rules of a chess 
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game are constitutive of the act, otherwise one is not playing chess. Rather, the rules of 
discourse give the form of discourse. Thus, Habermas states: “These rules must be 
follow in actual fact if error-free argumentation if to take place in real life.”234 In other 
words, if moral disagreements are to garner any type of common will then these rules 
are necessary presuppositions in any discourse.  
 Finally, Habermas concludes by responding to the still skeptic that might 
deny that there is a transcendental in discourse. The skeptic that is able to see from 
the outset that he will be caught in a performative contradiction will not participate 
in argumentation. “The consistent skeptic will deprive the transcendental pragmatist of 
a basis for his argument.”235 By appealing to his own cultural norms/rationality as if 
this is a foreign culture. In so far as the skeptic wishes to remain consistent they now 
take themselves out of the argument by positing that their rationality is substantively 
different than the one being used. Then, according to Habermas, it becomes 
impossible to talk with the skeptic, but only about them at this point. In response the 
cognitivist will say that less the whole moral theory becomes pointless arguments 
must continue, however one cannot force another to participate and be consistent. 
However, Habermas points out a further problem for this skeptic: 
By refusing to argue, for instance, he cannot, even indirectly, deny that he 
moves in a share sociocultural form of life, that he grew up in a web of 
communicative action, and that he reproduces his life in that web. In a word 
the skeptic may reject morality, but he cannot reject the ethical substance 
(Sittlichkei) of the life circumstances in which he spends his waking hours, not 
unless he is willing to take refuge in suicide or serious mental illness.236 
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Thus, the skeptic by virtue of being a rational being remains bounds to the everyday 
presuppositions of practical discourse.  
 The consequence then in denying a transcendental paradoxically places the 
skeptic in the trilemma. All understanding would rest on subjective understanding 
that would attempt to garner objective or at least collective understanding. Making 
distinctions would not be possible. Just as in experience were there is the necessity of 
distinctions of differences so too in understanding. Otherwise ‘the chair is black’ 
would be its opposite and itself at the same time. The chair would be both black and 
non-black at the same time and in the same respect; chair and not-chair as well; is 
and not-is. If no distinction is possible, nothing is knowable, because nothing could 
be recognizable. If nothing is knowable then meaning is not possible. On this 
reading of Habermas’ argument I find him saying that, if meaning is not possible 
then all that remains is nihilism.237 Since nihilism is existentially impossible (one 
cannot live without meaning) then it must be the case that rational justification 
through discourse is possible. Then it appears the infinite regress, the arbitrary 
justification, or the circular arguments all lead to this place because of the inherent 
contradictions. 
 From the arguments shortened and reproduced here I can now state what I 
find ought to be taken as transcendental. The first rule that Habermas lays out is that 
a speaker may not contradict him/herself. Be it formally or informally the words the 
speaker uses must be used in a consistent manner. This, and the rest of the first law 
(logical aspect of discourse) can be rephrased as the law of non-contradiction. In that 
                                                
237 I think this point can be made in connection with nominalism and Habermas’ 
response to the skeptic in that he states they would either have to commit sucide or 
have a mental illness.  
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it is presupposed by all other laws and acts the law of non-contradiction is most 
basic in understanding. This law of thought is presupposed by and makes the other 
laws possible, but cannot be deductively justified; rather it makes deductive 
justification (and any justification) possible. The other laws of thought in 
combination with this one (law of identity and excluded middle) make up what is 
transcendental in understanding. Any of these laws can easily derive the other two 
and they come as a set. One law cannot be denied while affirming any of the other 
two. If one were to affirm the law of identity but not the law of non-contradiction 
then the law of identity would be undermined as well and invalid. A would have to 
be A, without the law of non-contradiction A could be non-A which in turn denies 
that A is A (because it could be non-A).    
Conclusion 
Let us take an example by going back to Adorno’s “Never again Auschwitz.” 
In order to say that one ought not kill another requires showing that the other is a 
human and indeed does deserve the same, universal rights as the other humans. It 
would be hard to imagine that they truly believed they were killing humans, but 
rather they thought they were killing non-humans. One could not will the ethical 
maxim that human life is not valuable because that would forfeit the value of our life 
as well. Without being able to show that human nature is knowable and the 
argument authoritative (that is based upon the transcendental) one would not be able 
to justifiably stop the killing of others.  
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Kant and Habermas show that there must be a transcendental.238 It seems 
that, for Critical Pedagogy theorists, that which would be in this place is the will or 
experience. However, as Kant has already shown, experience cannot be 
transcendental or primary. Experience necessarily needs interpretation to come to 
understanding. One comes to understand their experiences in light of their beliefs 
about the world. These beliefs come from their understanding. The will needs to be 
guided by beliefs and values that are also held through our understanding about the 
world prior to deciding upon what to do. For example, if one believes in the 
existence of God, it will necessarily follow that they will come to interpret their 
experiences in light of this revelation, i.e., God made it possible for me to get this job 
or write this paper. Conversely if one holds to the non-existence of God they might 
appeal to the forces of causality for landing the job i.e., it necessarily followed due to 
such and such a situation (background or casually) that I would get this job or write 
this paper. Since neither the will nor experience are transcendental (i.e. they 
presuppose prior necessary conditions) and since there must be something 
transcendental it cannot be experience itself.   
 Democracy presupposes equality. Experience and the will cannot reach 
equality. Critical Pedagogy cannot furnish democracy or work as a critical education. 
The epistemic grounding of experience and the will fail to settle divisions such as 
those between Freire’s belief in God and suffering, Locke and Rousseau, Horowitz 
and Giroux’s political debate, divisions between theism and atheism, and between 
the United States and the Middle East. Since Critical Pedagogy only gets down to the 
                                                
238 As for the rest of their philosophical works I cannot comment on the amount I 
agree or disagree with them. At this time I am only using these arguments for a 
transcendental. 
 93 
level of power and ideology and is unable to critique the more basic assumptions 
behind ideologies and power relations it cannot settle these disputes.  
 In terms of hope for change Freire is correct. Hope is an ontological need. 
One cannot continue to exist in light of the trials and suffering of life without hope 
in a better future. However, hope in general consensus to change society is 
essentially an idea inherited from Rousseau that is found wanting. It assumes man 
will, or already is, seeking the good. That, inherently, men are good, and everywhere 
he is in chains.239 Rousseau himself assumes a state of nature of mankind as being by 
himself and having a natural inclination toward the good. This brings about a 
revolutionary utopianism through the consensus of the masses whereby change 
occurs through force (the will) and not through understanding. In order to make 
lasting change people need to be informed through education. If one is thought to 
be free yet does not know what to do, as Kant claimed, they will go about in blind 
ignorance. 
Critical pedagogy implicitly abandons the primacy of reason for the primacy 
of experience and the will. Once reason is abandoned, all hope is lost. This will 
invariably end in the exercise of power over others.  This will always result in 
oppression of differences without distinction. In order to combat oppression, instill, 
and maintain a democratic society whereby all people regardless of race, religion, 
creed, sex, etc are given equal voice, a philosophical basis for equality must be found. 
In order to establish a basis for this equality, the transcendental (Logos) must be 
discovered and built upon in order to have lasting change.  
                                                
239  Rousseau, An Inquiry into the Nature of the Social Contract, 3 
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Understanding the goal of education and moral philosophy is impossible 
without common ground. The subjective will and experience cannot maintain 
common ground amongst persons. Once understanding is abandoned the strongest 
will rule. Education becomes only an outworking of the influence of various 
dogmatic worldviews without justification. Critical pedagogy, at least how it is 
presented by Freire, Giroux, and others at a basic level becomes dogmatic by 
assuming the conceptual frameworks of postmodern ideologies that need to be 
further tested for meaning.  
 Without common ground there is no basis from which to decide what action 
or what education ought to look like. Without common ground, there is no point in 
critical education or education at all. When common ground is abandoned meaning 
is lost. Man cannot existentially maintain a life void of meaning. The will and 
experience therefore are no basis for common ground amongst humans. Therefore 
education ought to be built only upon what is common.  
This does not abandon nor stray from critical education. Not all the work 
done in this field has become meaningless. Culture remains ordinary.240 To 
understand the philosophic presuppositions that people built their systems of 
meaning upon “the ordinary” needs to be explored. Actions still show what is valued 
and believed to be valuable therefore it is still necessary to deconstruct systems of 
belief; cultures.  
Critical Pedagogy’s performative contradiction should not detract from the 
method by which they educate. The method of dialog and equal participation of all 
voices in the Socratic fashion is only furthered by Habermas and Kant’s arguments 
                                                
240  Williams, ‘Culture is Ordinary' in Resources of Hope 
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given here. Habermas’ rules of discourse in fact guarantee that all are able to 
participate in dialog that wish to and in so far as one lives in a sociocultural world 
they must participate in dialog. Therefore, I find that without abandoning the goals 
of Critical Pedagogy the transcendental presupposition of discourse establishes: the 
project of experience, anti-system, and inclusion.  
In the rules of discourse the project of experience is given relief in that all are 
able to participate and given equal voice. No experience is discounted due to 
ideological differences. Rather, different interpretations of experiences are given 
room to be discussed and debated with others that share those experiences but not 
the particular interpretation. The anti-system project is established in that in so far as 
a teacher and student has the acumen and ability to identify basic differences and 
discuss them. The project of inclusion is also established in that no voice is 
abandoned, equality is guaranteed in so far as (U) of moral theories is actual. Any 
moral theory that can be consistent with (U) by implication necessarily could not 
oppress others.  These goals can only be successful via the transcendental 
presupposition of dialogue and communicative action. Otherwise, the goals of 
Critical Pedagogy fall into the performative contradiction if they continue to base 
themselves upon the subjective. For individuals that might not be a problem, but is 
so far as the individual participates in the public sphere that necessarily presupposes 
corporate communicative action (by implication the rules of practical discourse) the 
individual cannot consistently hold to this position.  
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Future work 
 This leaves open a large amount of future work. This moment of inquiry is in 
no way shut. Though Critical Pedagogy is not actually a critical education there 
remains more work on defining what critical education ought to look like. Critical 
Pedagogy exists as a form of world disclosure, or as a worldview, that has not been 
critical of its own assumptions. Though many other areas inside this system can still 
be explored and used. For example, this does not abandon the dialogical/Socratic 
methods used by much of Critical Pedagogy, nor the critique against modernity. In 
fact those are building blocks for a future critical education.  
 I will to continue work in communication and education as an aspect of 
moral philosophy by exploring this notion of the transcendental in understanding. By 
understanding understanding common ground can be established. If common 
ground can be established then education can then be a place of building an 
egalitarian society, in Kant’s words a Kingdom of Ends. This future endeavor I wish 
to partake of will necessarily lead me down the epistemic road of examining what has 
been held at various points in history as a transcendental and systematically 
examining them.  
In future works various theories of language and reason will need to be 
examined. Jacque Derrida's difference that suggests that meaning is the product of a 
language constructed out of and subject to the endless play of difference among 
signifiers; "what constitutes the meaning of a signifier is defined by the shifting, 
changing relation of difference that characterize the referential play of 
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language."241 Ferdinand de Saussure system of difference where meaning is a 
historical/cultural production between the sign and the signifier, Noam Chomsky’s 
linguistic theories as innate ideas, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russel, Rudolf 
Carnap, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Martin Heidegger and others will all be necessary in 
understanding understanding. If any of them attempt to force subjective experience 
upon others as an objective form or they become self-referentially absurd. The task 
ahead is daunting, however education as a form of endowing persons with 
understanding is ultimately worth it.  
 
 
 
                                                
241  Giroux, Pedagogy and the Politics of Hope: Theory, Culture, and Schooling:  A Critical 
Reader, 202 
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